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I. INTRODUCTION
ROM Elvis' army days until the Beatles' invasion of America - from
Ike to LBJ - the United States Supreme Court appeared concerned
with, but baffled by, one recurring issue of federal/state choice-of-law.
While the Warren Court was revolutionizing the federal/state balance in the
area of civil rights, it also showed interest in the apparently more mundane
question of whether state law provides the standard for federal trial and ap-
pellate courts to review a jury verdict in an action based on diversity
jurisdiction.
It was a classic problem of choice-of-law under Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.I The circuits were split on the issue, some applying a federal
standard of review, others looking to the state jury review test in those cases
in which state law provided the rule of decision. 2 In response, during the
1958-1964 period the Supreme Court at least twice faced the issue3 (once
after granting certiorari on it),4 but could never seem to answer it - or even
deal with it. Instead, the Court repeatedly found other grounds by which to
resolve the case before it, while still leaving open the jury review issue5 or
otherwise passing up the chance to resolve it,6 leaving lower courts in
disarray. 7
The Court played this game of chicken while it had no apparent trouble
reaching decision after decision in the more blatantly controversial areas of
political, civil, and personal rights. 8 It was the most dramatic of times, it
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (denying general federal common law, requiring application of
state law in diversity cases, but apparently allowing federal courts to determine and apply their
own procedures).
2. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1959) (noting circuit
conflict at that time); Edmund M. Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REV.
153 (1944) (collecting older cases); see also infra note 184.
3. Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152, 155-56 (1964) (per curiam) (issue fully briefed and
argued); Dick, 359 U.S. at 444-45 (noting that an "important question" is "lurking" of
"whether it is proper to apply a state or federal test of sufficiency of evidence to support a jury
verdict where federal jurisdiction is rested on diversity of citizenship").
4. See Mercer, 377 U.S. at 156 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. Id. (majority opinion) ("The evidence was sufficient under any standard which might
be appropriate - state or federal."); Dick, 359 U.S. at 445 ("But the question is not properly
here for decision because, in the briefs and arguments in this Court, both parties assumed that
the North Dakota standard applied.").
6. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 221-22 (1963) (discussing application of federal
law on issue of availability of jury trial, but not resolving review of juries); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-40 (1958) (same).
7. See Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal
Courts, 55 MINN. L. REV. 903, 972 (1971) (as of 1971, "Supreme Court has explicitly avoided
making a choice," leading to inconsistent cases below).
8. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding federal con-
stitutional privilege applies in state libel claim brought by public official); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (holding exclusionary rule to enforce Fourth Amendment applies to states);
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was the most mundane of times - yet the Court seemed to more easily
resolve the day's hot issues.
To be sure, in 1965 the Court did provide general Erie guidance in Hanna
v. Plumer.9 That decision, and especially its language, could be seen as an
inspiration for lower courts to address anew the circuit conflict on the partic-
ular standard of review issue which the Supreme Court had avoided.' 0 To-
day, nearly thirty years later, Hanna is still seen as an important
contribution to the development of Erie doctrine." Yet the Court did not
purport to resolve the baffling jury review issue, and since then has not ex-
pressly returned to this particular Erie question of review over jury verdicts
in diversity cases.
After Hanna, many lower courts indeed revisited the issue. For example,
the Sixth Circuit's call to arms, or at least a call to question, was clear and
swift. In 1968, the court said that "recent developments would make a re-
view of our position appropriate."' 12 In fact, twice in the past quarter cen-
tury the Sixth Circuit has openly called into question its use of state
standards to review jury verdicts in diversity actions.' 3 This has prompted
several bouts of scholarly speculation over a perceived imminent change in
the circuit's application of state law in such cases. 14
Yet despite the court's public hand-wringing, the commentators' predic-
tions of change, and a growing majority of other circuits that found federal
standards to be applicable,' 5 the Sixth Circuit in fact refused to abandon its
state-standard rule. 16 Today the rule survives intact, 17 a testament to a
failed prediction. Likewise, other circuits which, after Hanna, acknowl-
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: II CIVIL RIGHTS 1610-25 (Bernard
Schwartz, ed., 1970) (discussing landmark rights cases of Warren Court applying federal
power, including voting rights).
9. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (applying federal rule allowing substituted service of process de-
spite conflicting state rule). Of course, Hanna - authored by the Chief Justice himself - can
be seen as broadening federal rulemaking power in a variety of ways consistent with the fed-
eral-expansive Warren Court agenda in other areas of the law.
10. See, e.g., Gold v. National Savings Bank, 641 F.2d 430, 434 n.3 (6th Cir.) (noting
some shift in Third Circuit and Tenth Circuit after Hanna), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981);
Lones v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 398 F.2d 914, 919 (6th Cir. 1968) (noting open issue after
Hanna), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1063 (1969); Planters Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 380
F.2d 869, 870-71 (5th Cir.) (examining issue and circuit split after then-recent Supreme Court
cases), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 930 (1967). Note, too, the further court avoidance suggested by
the consistent denial of certiorari in such cases.
11. See, e.g., Mary K. Kane, The Golden Wedding Year.- Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 673-79 (1988); John H. Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 696-700 (1974); CHARLES A. WRIGHT,
LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS §§ 55-60 (4th ed. 1983).
12. Lones, 398 F.2d at 919 (citing Hanna).
13. Gold, 641 F.2d at 434 n.3 (the "continued vitality" of the state-standard rule "is open
to question"); Lones, 398 F.2d at 919 (stating that Hanna places state-standard rule in doubt).
14. See, e.g., infra notes 237, 259, and 297, noting sources which underrate the conflicting
case law on this issue. Some sources treat the issue as fully resolved, despite the conflicting
case law. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE
§ 5.03, at 133 (1987).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 184-93.
16. Gold, 641 F.2d at 434 n.3; Lones, 398 F.2d at 919.
17. See infra note 230.
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edged the circuit split on this issue have either held to their guns, applying a
state standard of review despite Hanna's leanings,18 or refused to decide the
issue at all, preferring to moot the dilemma in case after case by applying
both a federal and state standard to review the verdict at hand.19 In still
other courts, the issue is unsettled in light of an apparent split even within
the circuit as to the appropriate review. 20
The disarray continues, with few opinions providing any more analysis
than a citation to an older case which in turn has not fully considered the
problem. The state-standard rule is like the weather: everyone talks about it
but no one does anything about it. The impact, like the weather, is fickle:
the courts' choice of review rules, though making incremental or no differ-
ence where state law is similar,2' can significantly affect the review process in
particular cases. 22
Federal courts today are faced with even more reasons to adopt a uniform
federal standard in all challenges to a civil jury verdict. This article analyzes
this long-questioned but still-surviving diversity dilemma.23 Unlike the
weather, something can be done: the issue should be properly predicted and
finally resolved. The mystery is solved when interpreted from the clouds of
recent Supreme Court decisions on other issues, as well as the 1991 amend-
ment to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 24 Both develop-
ments subtly support the application of federal law.
Moreover, when considered in the theoretical light of the allocation of
decisionmaking power between the judge and the jury in the federal system,
18. See infra notes 211 (Seventh Circuit) and 257 (First Circuit).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 268-98 (Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits).
20. See. e.g., infra notes 257-60 (First Circuit), 264-65 (Federal Circuit), 288-97 (Third
Circuit) and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 229, 248, 258, 269, and 300.
22. See infra notes 154, 179, 227, 249-56, 269-70 and accompanying text.
23. Although diversity jurisdiction is the article's principal focus, its analysis may actually
apply more broadly to include all similar federal cases based on state substantive law, such as
federal question cases which involve state law substance as well. Other contexts that borrow
state law raise similar Erie problems, for which the same rule of review should also apply. See,
e.g., Ellison v. Conoco, Inc., 950 F.2d 1196, 1203 n.8 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying diversity rule
regarding jury review in Louisiana law case brought under Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1331), cert. denied,! 13 S. Ct. 3003 (1993); Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity
Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428 (1960). But cf Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie
on the Right Track, 49 U. PiTr. L. REV. 937, 942 n. 11 (1988) (noting dissimilarity of such
"quasi-Erie situations" for purposes of pure federalism analysis). For example, courts sitting
in admiralty may also face state law issues which may be treated as in diversity appeals. E.g.,
In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); see also infra note 98 (discussing
actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)).
The article does not deal directly with another type of question thought to emanate from
Erie: the extent to which federal courts are empowered to create federal common law, e.g.,
where state courts do not conflict or law that would be binding on states as well. See generally
George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law
Adjudication - A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229 (1992); Donald L. Doernberg,
Juridical Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 759; Martha A. Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law (pt. 1), 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986).
Nevertheless, considerations of institutional allocation of decisionmaking authority do inform
the particular choice-of-law question analyzed here. See infra text accompanying notes 430-
38.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 310-55.
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such a uniform federal rule finds ample support in the historic policies and
modern theories behind Erie's allocation of decisionmaking power between
state and federal bodies. 25 At the intersection of both such institutional allo-
cations of judicial authority, the Erie jury review issue requires a uniform
rule in at least two senses: uniform among and within the reviewing courts,
and uniform as to other standards of review which raise similar issues of
state/federal assignment of power. 26 This dual allocation is further sup-
ported by the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority between trial
and appellate courts, 27 in effect forming x, y, z axes whose three-dimensional
point of intersection justifies the final adoption of a federal jury review
process.
This article first discusses the various procedural contexts in which judi-
cial review issues may arise within diversity and other state-law actions, in-
cluding review over dismissals, jury instructions, summary judgments, non-
jury trials, new trial motions, and damages (part II). After demonstrating
that nearly all courts in nearly all such contexts correctly apply a federal
rule of review (and further criticizing the notable but aberrant exceptions),
the article then examines the more problematic context of review over civil
juries for sufficiency of the evidence (part III). The article analyzes this issue
in light of recent cases and rules, as well as a more theoretically satisfying
allocation of decisionmaking authority at the intersection of three dichoto-
mies (part IV): judge and jury, trial and appeal, and state and federal courts.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER CIVIL LITIGATION DECISIONS
A. LITIGATION CONTEXTS, SANCTIONS, DISMISSALS, AND JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
Many standards of review over litigation decisions are routinely and un-
controversially provided by federal law, not state rules. 28 For example, the
Supreme Court has applied, in a recent diversity case in which the state rule
differed, its federally-developed rule to review the propriety and amount of
sanctions under the "inherent power" doctrine. 29  Similarly, the Court has
held that an Alabama statute that imposed an additional 10% damages on a
monetary judgment if an appeal is affirmed does not displace Rule 38 of the
25. See infra text accompanying notes 385-95 and 430-32.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 410-29.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 433-37.
28. For a helpful survey of other federal rules, and their applicability in diversity cases,
see Darrell N. Braman & Mark D. Neumann, The Still Unrepressed Myth of Erie, 18 U. BALT.
L. REV. 403, 414-67 (1989). The present article considers judicial review issues which may or
may not involve the application at trial of a particular federal rule, and therefore there is little
overlap with such general surveys.
29. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2123, 2136-38 (1991) (upholding award of$996,644 in a Louisiana case, and specifically finding federal power controls; review is for
abuse). By contrast, Louisiana law allows fee shifting only by contract or statute, with no
general exception for bad faith practice. See Quealy v. Paine, Webber, Jackson, & Curtis, Inc.,
475 So. 2d 756 (La. 1985).
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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in a diversity case. 30 Review of sanc-
tions, then, is uniformly a federal matter.31
In testing the propriety of a dismissal for failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, it is clear that all federal courts apply Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as its federal procedures and
review rules,32 including the established de novo appellate review the trial
court's disposition is given. 33 In all such cases, the uniform federal proce-
dure requires that the district court considering a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) should not grant it unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to recover under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of his claim. 34 The appellate court reviews under the
same federal standard.3 5
Likewise, federal law governs the dismissal for other defects under Rule
12,36 the related pleading requirements of Rule 8, 37 and the review given to
30. Burlington Northern R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987). Rule 38 instead requires a
case-by-case approach in the federal courts. See FED. R. App. P. 38.
31. See, e.g., Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real Estate & Mortgage Inv., 951 F.2d
1399 (3d Cir. 1991) (diversity case applying and reviewing under federal Rule 11); Automatic
Liquid Packaging, Inc. v. Dominik, 909 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Chapman & Cole v.
Itel Container Int'l, 865 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); In re
Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
By contrast, the availability and propriety of attorneys' fees on the merits (as part of the
substantive remedy not for punishment or deterrence as sanctions) may follow state law. See
Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2136-38 (distinguishing fee shifting on merits); LaRoche Indus., Inc.
v. AIG Risk Mgmt., Inc., 959 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying Georgia law on fees
and costs; using Georgia review test even on j.n.o.v.); Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d
679, 687-90 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing Erie issue on attorney and witness fees; state law con-
trols yet review is for abuse).
Costs may be governed by federal law. See 10 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2669 (1983) (arguing for federal law on award of costs under
Rule 54(d)).
32. Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 696 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding federal
rule, not state practice, applies); see, e.g., Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d
1545, 1551 (10th Cir. 1992) (diversity case applying Rule 12(b)(6) without discussion); Ci-
tibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1490 (2d Cir. 1992) (same).
33. E.g., Citibank, 968 F.2d at 1494 (applying de novo appellate standard in diversity
case); Aragon v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985); Alonzo v. ACF Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 643 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1981)(diversity appeal applying same test as trial court).
34. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 742 (1976)
(describing general Rule 12(b)(6) standard); Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d
324, 325 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying federal standard in diversity case).
35. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (appellate review generally de-
scribed); Boone, 972 F.2d at 1551 (diversity case).
36. See, e.g., Resendez v. United States, 993 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1993) (de novo review of
Rule 12(b)(1) decision applied in diversity case); Mundy v. United States, 983 F.2d 950, 952(9th Cir. 1993) (same); Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (Rule 12(b)(1) review, in a diversity case, described as de novo over law but clear error as
to fact); Ynclan v. Department of the Air Force, 943 F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1991) (same);
see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 461-64 (1965) (service of process rules given by federal
law).
37. E.g., Simpson v. James, 903 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting waiver for failure
to plead discovery rule since Rule 8 notice test was satisfied: "federal law governs the pleading
requirements of a case in federal court") (footnote omitted); Milano by Milano v. Freed, 767 F.
Supp. 450, 452-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (analyzing Erie issue).
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most evidentiary rulings, 38 including the interpretation and review of contro-
versial rules related to expert testimony.3 9
Involuntary dismissal for failure to raise sufficient proof in a nonjury trial,
formerly governed by Rule 41(b), is now treated as a judgment on partial
findings under Rule 52(c).4 Since this motion serves as a vehicle for the
trial court to find facts during a bench trial,4 1 it raises the same Erie issue -
does the clearly erroneous rule apply, or state law? - as does the usual non-
jury verdict context. 42
The method of instructing the jury presents one of the more settled con-
texts in which a federal standard of review is nearly always chosen. The
form of jury instruction is considered a procedural point.43 The federal
courts in diversity cases therefore usually look to federal law in framing in-
structions at trial and in reviewing charge form on appeal, 44 even in the
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits,4 5 which have a history of looking to
state law for the standard governing review of jury verdicts on a motion for
judgment n.o.v. 4 6
Thus, in all courts, the federal method of objecting to erroneous instruc-
tions controls.47 Federal law apparently provides the rule concerning
38. E.g., Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993); Warner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1347, 1351 n.6 (8th Cir.
1984); Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners, Inc., 672 F.2d 1231, 1238 n.14 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding
admissibility of evidence is procedural and federal); Association of Am. R.Rs. v. ICC, 600
F.2d 989, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (generally state substantive law creates underlying rights
and duties, while federal law governs evidence, pleading, and practice). But cf Carota v. Johns
Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448, 450 (1st Cir.) (state evidentiary rule permitting admission of
settlement evidence is to be applied in diversity case since jury's hearing of evidence affects
substantive rights of plaintiff), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990).
39. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2790 (1993) (analyzing
Rule 702 in an explicitly diversity-based case); cf Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 207
(3d Cir. 1991) (leaving Erie question open).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(c) (1991) (replacing and broadening Rule 41(b) dismissal for "no
right to relief").
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52 Advisory Committee Notes, 1991 Amend. (indicating Rule
52(c) judgment is a decision on the merits reviewed by the clearly erroneous rule and requiring
factfinding as always under Rule 52(a)).
42. See infra note 72.
43. E.g., Ulmer v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 823 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1987); Stineman
v. Fontbonne College, 664 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1981); McNamara v. Dionne, 298 F.2d 352 (2d
Cir. 1962); see 5A JAMES W. MOORE & Jo D. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 51.02-
1 (2d ed. 1991) (federal method and manner of instruction controls in diversity cases).
44. E.g., Proteus Books Ltd. v. Cherry Lane Music Co., 873 F.2d 502, 514 (2d Cir. 1989);
Seltzer v. Chesley, 512 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1975); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264,
1289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Smith v. Mill Creek Court, Inc., 457 F.2d
589, 592 (10th Cir. 1972).
45. E.g., Ulmer v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 823 F.2d 1278, 1284 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987)
(procedures on jury charge are federal law in diversity cases); Porter v. C.A. Dawson & Co.,
703 F.2d 290 (8th Cir. 1983) (federal jury charge form controls); In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chicago, 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983); Lones v.
Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 398 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1063 (1969).
46. See infra notes 211-56, 271-81 and accompanying text, comparing the sufficiency re-
view rule for these courts.
47. See, e.g., Starr v. J. Hacker Co., 688 F.2d 78, 80-81 (8th Cir. 1982); Platis v. Stock-
well, 630 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1980); Stewart v. Ford Motor Co., 553 F.2d 130, 139 n.9
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Batesole v. Stratford, 505 F.2d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 1974).
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whether the appellate court affirms if one of two theories accepted by the
jury was correctly submitted,48 as well as the use of special verdicts49 and
the trial judge's power to summarize and comment on the evidence.50
This federal review process is stated generally among the circuits as one
for abuse of discretion.51 As long as the jury is not prejudiced or confused,
variations in language are ignored. 52 Even as to content, the reviewing court
considers "the charge as a whole, viewing it in the light of the allegations of
the complaint, the evidence, and the arguments of counsel,"'5 3 and "[i]f,
viewed in that light, the jury instructions are comprehensive, balanced, fun-
damentally accurate, and not likely to confuse or mislead the jury, the
charge will be deemed adequate."'54
The only real Erie dilemma is distinguishing between charge form and
content in applying this settled review rule in a particular case. When state
law defines the contested right or action, state law of course governs the
substance of the charge.5 5 (This may mean, for example, that state law man-
48. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies, 719 F.2d 1092, 1098-99 (1lth Cir.
1983). The court in Royal reasoned from its rule on jury review, not jury charge, so it may be
that the "two-issue rule" will be used in those courts that apply state sufficiency tests. Cf
Braun v. Flynt, 731 F.2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir.) (on rehearing) (apparently citing Texas law on
proper combination of jury instructions), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883 (1984). See generally Wil-
liam V. Dorsaneo III, Broad-Form Submission of Jury Questions and the Standard of Review,
46 SMU L. REV. 601 (1992) (discussing generally the appellate review of jury instructions and
its misleading abuse of discretion standard); id. at 634-37 (discussing federal and Texas cases
on review of broad-form jury instructions and harmless error).
49. See, e.g., Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523, 531 (8th Cir. 1980)
(whether to use); Elston v. Morgan, 440 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1971) (form of questions too); 9
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2502,
at 487 (1971).
50. See Games v. Gulf& Western Mfg. Co., 789 F.2d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 1986) (diversity
case discussing extent of judge's power to comment on evidence); Cranberg v. Consumers
Union of U.S., 756 F.2d 382, 391 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); Warner
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1347, 1351 (8th Cir. 1984) (same); Seidman v. Fishburne-
Hudgins Educ. Found., 724 F.2d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 1984) (same); see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 540 (1958) (emphasizing federal judge's control powers, in-
cluding assessment of credibility).
51. E.g., Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 479 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating general rule
that formulation of jury instructions is matter of district court discretion, reviewed for abuse);
Dobbs v. Gulf Oil Co., 759 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1985) (use of special verdict reviewed for abuse
of discretion); Martinez v. Union Pac. R.R., 714 F.2d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 1983) (court has
discretion over format, frame, and number of special interrogatories). However, some courts
add that a failure to submit a proper jury instruction is a legal question reviewed de novo.
Benigni, 879 F.2d at 479.
52. See Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Mus-
somelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1134 (3d Cir. 1983); Baker & Co., Fla. v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co.,
569 F.2d 1347, 1350 (5th Cir. 1979).
All circuits follow a related rule that erroneous instructions are not reversible if the verdict
would have been justified by a directed verdict. E.g., L & S Ent. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
454 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1971); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dondlinger & Sons Constr. Co., 420 F.2d
1368 (8th Cir. 1970). Thus, even appeal of a jury charge can indirectly bring up the unsettled
Erie context of directed verdicts discussed below in part III.
53. Smith v. Borg-Warner Corp., 626 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. Scheib v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 628 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
55. E.g., Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing
substantive state law in jury charge from federal jury review of punitive damages); Schleier v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
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dates the issues of material fact that are to be covered in special verdicts. 56)
The actual content of jury instructions presents, then, a question of substan-
tive law rather than standard of review, and legal errors objected to are
freely reversed if prejudicial. Yet the process and review of jury instructions
must always be understood as an exercise in federal rule-application.
The Erie issue becomes stickier when one turns to judicial review over
verdicts or other factfinding processes and results which occur in various
contexts in federal courts. Blanket statements about the applicability of fed-
eral tests no longer apply so confidently. Even here, however, the most un-
settled context involves review over the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a jury verdict. After analyzing the other contexts in which verdict or
factfinding review may arise (in rough order from most readily resolved and
understood to more complex), this article develops the particular jury review
issue which has given the federal courts such fits over the years.
B. REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 if the full record dis-
closes "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."' 57 Although the
motion traditionally was seen as a disfavored procedure, 58 it has resurged in
use and reputation over the past decade, 59 as prompted in 1986 by a trilogy
of Supreme Court cases. 60
On appeal, the review standard is de novo 6 I since the appellate court ap-
plies the same Rule 56 test as does the trial court.62 That test is also
presented as the standard of review, in effect, for both courts, because it
49, § 2555, at 651-52 (charge is state substance). But cf infra notes 138-41 (jury charge may
be limited by due process, especially in light of recent cases on excessive damages).
56. See Martinez v. Union Pac. R.R., 714 F.2d at 1032. Itis less clear, however, whether
federal courts ignore a state rule that governs whether a jury must be told the legal effect of its
answers. See, e.g., Martin v. Texaco, Inc., 726 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowing and discuss-
ing jury instruction); JAMES M. FISCHER, FEDERAL TRIAL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK § 11.8
(1985) (discussing whether a jury must be told the legal consequences of its answers).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See generally 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, § 2711 (his-
torical background); Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analy-
sis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974) (summary judgment theory).
58. See, e.g., Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (reviewing court's
history of denying motion if "slightest doubt" existed), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987);
Louis, supra note 57, at 760-62 (reviewing courts' disfavor).
59. See generally Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a
Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988).(discussing recent law
on motion and its increased potential); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme
Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Pro-
cess, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988) (same); Steven A. Childress, A New Era for Summary Judg-
ments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 6 REV. OF LITIG. 263 (1987) (same).
60. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
61. E.g., Hawaiian Life Ins. Co. v. Laygo, 884 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1989); Hammock
v. Bowen, 879 F:2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 892 (5th
Cir. 1989); Casper v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1986); Thrasher v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 637, 638 (11th Cir. 1984).
62. E.g., Degan, 869 F.2d at 892; Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Rees, 852 F.2d 595, 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1010 (1989); Thrasher, 734 F.2d at 638; First Jersey Nat'l
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
controls whether entry and affirmance of the motion is proper. 63 But in-
dependent review necessarily follows since the sufficiency of the evidence is
viewed as a question of law.64
For both trial and appellate courts, the Erie question is the same: does the
federal rule (and its twin review rules which follow) apply in state-law cases?
The answer is straightforward in all courts. Courts apply the federal Rule
56 test and procedure in diversity cases, 65 even in circuits which would
otherwise apply a state test on post-trial jury review.66 This was apparently
true (though not discussed) in two of the 1986 Supreme Court cases
themselves.6 7
Of course, the legal issues underlying the motion, including presumably
the materiality of a fact, are creatures of state law in such cases. 68 As the
Court noted, "the materiality determination rests on the substantive law,
[and] it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and
which facts are irrelevant that governs."'69 Moreover, to the extent burdens
and standards of proof are now considered within the application of the fed-
eral summary judgment analysis, those burdens are likely found in state sub-
stantive law for that cause of action.70
Bank v. Dome Petroleum Ltd., 723 F.2d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 1983); Portis v. Folk Constr. Co.,
694 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1982).
63. See generally Steven A. Childress, Federal Summary Judgments on Appeal: Review
and Jurisdiction, 9 FIFTH CIR. RPTR. 513 (Feb. 1992) (clarifying Rule 56 test and review on
appeal, and criticizing courts using abuse of discretion test for denials of motion).
64. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-52.
65. E.g., Pruitt v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 895 F.2d 734, 736 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
899 (1990); West v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 868 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1989); Reinke v.
O'Connell, 790 F.2d 850, 851 (11 th Cir. 1986) (applying Rule 56 in face of Georgia "contrary
expert opinion rule"); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.
1985); General Accid. Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Akzona Inc., 622 F.2d 90 (4th Cir.
1980); Neely v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 345 & nn.2-3 (9th Cir. 1978);
Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123 n.5 (5th Cir. 1978); cf Neal Miller, An Empir-
ical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdic-
tion, 41 AM. U.L. REV. 369, 438-40 (1992) (citing survey that finds that defense attorneys
forum-shop to take advantage of generous federal summary judgment law).
66. See Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Veg. & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427,
430 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983) (specifically distinguishing use of state review rule on j.n.o.v.); Schultz
v. Newsweek, Inc., 668 F.2d 911, 917 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); Fitzsimmons v. Best, 528 F.2d
692, 693 (7th Cir. 1976).
67. See infra notes 319-24 and accompanying text.
68. See West, 868"F.2d at 350 (noting California insurance law provides substance); Clark
v. ABC, 684 F.2d 1208, 1212 (6th Cir. 1982) ("In determining whether there exists a genuine
issue as to a material fact, we apply the substantive [libel] law of Michigan."), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1040 (1983).
69. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (apparently applying local law of libel).
70. See id.; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); see also infra notes 402-03 and
accompanying text. But cf Braman & Neumann, supra note 28, at 466-67 (arguing that bur-
den of proof rules are procedural under Rules Enabling Act and therefore need not apply if in
conflict with Rule 56). Most commentators assume that burdens of proof and presumptions
are substantive at least for Rules of Decision Act purposes and therefore apply in diversity
cases. E.g., Ely, supra note 11, at 714. And even courts which apply federal rules to review
juries bow to state burdens of proof. See infra notes 204-06.
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C. REVIEW OF FACTFINDING IN NONJURY TRIALS
Rule 52(a) requires a federal district court, acting as a finder of fact, to
separate and spell out its factual findings and conclusions of law. The rule
also provides a standard to review the result: findings of fact "shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous. '71 Rule 52, as applied broadly in many
courts, also sets the standard for factfinding and clearly erroneous review in
many situations incidental to the classic bench trial, 72 including preliminary
injunctions, civil contempt hearings, advisory juries, habeas hearings, and
masters' reports. 73
The clearly erroneous standard is not supposed to be as exacting or defer-
ential as a jury review standard of reasonableness or substantial evidence.74
Appellate courts simply "hesitate less" to reverse a trial judge's findings. 75
Nevertheless, the standard requires substantial deference, 76 perhaps more so
in recent years. 77 It has been defined by the Court as allowing reversal when
"the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed."' 78 This now means that: "If
the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
72. A Rule 52(c)judgment on partialfindings (whenever it is entered) is a decision on the
merits. It is reviewed by the clearly erroneous standard as well. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a). Its
name is consistent with the 1991 amendment to Rule 50(a), which allows judgment "as a
matter of law" during trial in jury cases. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52 Advisory Committee Notes,
1991 Amend. Although this may imply that Rule 52(c) likewise provides a procedure limited
to the legal insufficiency of the evidence, in the nonjury context it allows the court to go ahead
and find facts and resolve evidentiary conflicts, unlike Rule 50(a). See Continental Cas. Co. v.
DHL Servs., Inc., 752 F.2d 353, 355-56 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing Rule 41(b) review); I
STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW §§ 2.01,
5.06 (2d ed. 1992) (analyzing factfinding discretion of new Rule 52(c), and distinguishing new
Rule 50).
73. See Steven A. Childress, "Clearly Erroneous"- Judicial Review Over District Courts in
the Eighth Circuit and Beyond, 51 Mo. L. REV. 93, 100-07 (1986) (reviewing various exten-
sions of applicability beyond bench trials).
74. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264,
2279 (1993) (stating unreasonableness test for jury "require[s] even greater certainty of error"
on reviewer's part); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992) (judge
findings "need a stronger evidentiary base"); Case v. Morrisette, 475 F.2d 1300, 1306-07 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (contrasting jury test); Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Ratio-
nalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 650 (1988) (discuss-
ing and explaining differences in deference to juries and judges: "somewhat less deference");
Childress, supra note 73, at 109-15.
75. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945) (Learned
Hand, J.).
76. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
77. See, e.g., Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate Fact
Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Erroneous?, 52 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 68, 80-81, 84-86 (1977). In a forthcoming essay, I argue that newer, cute versions of
the test move it too close to hands-off jury review. Steven A. Childress, Caviar Emptor: The
"Dead Fish" Standard and Judgment on Partial Findings (1994) (manuscript on file with
author).
78. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Most later Court cases




Review of findings made by a district court sitting in diversity should be a
settled issue in favor of applying the federal Rule 52(a) standard, even
though state law provides the substance of the action. Rule 52 is an express
procedural rule,80 and the standard of review it prescribes defines the power
distribution among federal courts.81
The applicability of Rule 52 in diversity actions is in fact rarely discussed
in the cases, apparently because the Erie issue under Rule 52 is not as con-
troversial as for jury review in the directed verdict and new trial contexts, in
which express dispute in the authorities has been fierce.82 Most state-law
cases just cite the clearly erroneous rule without discussion.83 This assump-
tion needs little authority to convince, though a few cases are helpful in spe-
cifically holding that the test is provided by federal, not state, procedures. 84
This nearly uniform rule is further supported by U.S. Supreme Court
cases, arising at trial under diversity jurisdiction, which discuss the applica-
bility of clearly erroneous deference. None even hints that a state review rule
would ordinarily apply.
For example, neither Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. 85 nor Salve Regina College v. Russell 8 6 - both diversity cases - raises
any claim that Rule 52(a) is inapplicable because the action applies state law.
Both instead find its deference inapplicable for larger reasons: in Bose, the
issue of defamation "actual malice" is one of constitutional fact, reviewed
without the strictures of a clearly erroneous rule in order to protect First
Amendment interests,87 while in Salve Regina, appellate courts must have
free review over all errors of law, even if they arise from state or local law. 8
Indeed, the Salve Regina Court contrasted de novo review over legal conclu-
sions with Rule 52(a)'s "deference to the unchallenged superiority of the
79. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985); accord, e.g., Amadeo
v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988); Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court, 825 F.2d 111, 116 (6th Cir. 1987).
80. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-74 (1965) (issues specified by Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, if arguably procedural, do not present Erie problem of constitutionality); 9
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 49, § 2585, at 730 n.93 (1971) (on Rule 52 review, state law is
"irrelevant").
81. See Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (indicating in remittitur
context that relationship between judge and jury is matter of federal law); see also infra notes
385-91 and accompanying text.
82. See infra note 154. The jury review contexts may be considered less settled because
they traditionally did not fall under a standard specified in the federal rules. Nevertheless, the
authorities generally do not extend their Erie analyses to Rule 52 actions or address the cases
below that ignore the clear error rule in nonjury trials.
83. See, e.g., Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353, 1358 (10th Cir. 1981) (FTCA case
applying state law reviews under Rule 52); Early v. John A. Cooper Co., 435 F.2d 342, 346
(8th Cir. 1970) (diversity case using conviction of mistake test).
84. E.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 798 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Hanna);
Grenier v. Harley, 250 F.2d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1957). Note that American Casualty Co. incon-
sistently seems to apply a state damages rule. See infra note 100.
85. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
86. 499 U.S. 225 (1991). The Court found de novo review to apply to determinations of
state law made in federal district court. Id. at 239.
87. Bose, 466 U.S. at 509-11.
88. Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 231-32.
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district court's factfinding ability," and added: "Nothing about the exercise
of diversity jurisdiction alters these functional components of decisionmak-
ing .... "89 In both cases it is clear the analysis applies generally and has
nothing to do with the diversity context,90 and both are routinely cited
outside their specific contexts. It is apparent, then, that the Supreme Court,
like so many lower courts, treats the applicability of Rule 52 and its review
standard in diversity appeals as a non-issue. There is no reason not to, and it
would appear gratuitous for the Court to belabor the obvious: the federal
rule controls.
Similarly, in Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. ,91 the Court reviewed
the Second Circuit's own review of a choice-of-law determination made by
the district court. The Court found that the district court's findings as to the
parties' agreement were not clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a) and thus
reversed the court of appeals. 92 Again no distinction was made, even though
the finding may have hinged on New York contract law.9 3 Indeed, in later
proceedings the Second Circuit acknowledged that the choice-of-law issue
considered state law and that jurisdiction was based in part on diversity,94
yet made no distinction as to the proper review rule.
On the other hand, occasional lower court cases have noted a possible
open issue as to which test applies. 95 Others apply a state standard without
discussing why. One Tenth Circuit case, for example, cites the New Mexico
jury standard in reviewing a diversity bench trial96 - an aberration espe-
cially ironic since the Tenth Circuit more consistently applies the federal
jury test when reviewing jury verdicts, 97 supposedly a more controversial
context.
The Sixth Circuit once applied Florida's jury test to review a judge's dam-
ages calculation, compounding its error by saying: "The rule is no different
when a judge acts as the finder of fact, as the District Court did here." 98 Of
89. Id. at 233.
90. In Salve Regina, to be sure, there would be no claim (to reject) of deference on state
law if it were not a diversity case, but the Court's conclusion that errors of law are freely
reversed applies in all cases; the Court was merely extending the usual nondiversity review rule
to diversity cases too, see 499 U.S. at 233-34, so the case hardly supports a distinction for
diversity cases.
91. 495 U.S. 660 (1990).
92. Id. at 670-72 (applying mistake test).
93. See id. at 673-74 (remanding but refusing to specify whether federal common law
preempts New York law here).
94. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723, 726 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2990 (1992).
95. See Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 173 n.I (8th Cir. 1971)
(Minnesota courts review judge just like jury, while federal review test for judges is instead
clear error - though here either judge or jury test upholds findings.).
96. Madrid v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 486 F.2d 856, 858 (10th Cir. 1973); see also
Stoody Co. v. Royer, 374 F.2d 672, 681 (10th Cir. 1967).
97. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
98. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 1006 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Early v. United
States, 474 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1973) (applying Alaska test). Although both Downs and
Early are damages appeals under the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)) rather
than diversity cases, they seem to make the same error of reviewing under state law as do the
similar diversity cases, despite the general rule that FTCA findings, including damages, must
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course it is; Rule 52 was designed specifically for review of judges. 99 The
Erie error was repeated in a later case.t°°
The Seventh Circuit has declined to review at all the district court's re-
fusal to award punitive damages available under Wisconsin law.10 '
Although Wisconsin state courts defer completely to such a refusal in jury
trials, ' 0 2 the federal appellate reviewing role, as opposed to sheer legal avail-
ability of such damages, 10 3 is more appropriately specified by a federal pro-
cess and review rule. 10 4
Any inconsistency regarding state tests for nonjury trials arises most often
either in reviewing damages, when perhaps the court is confusing the
sharper debate over review of new trial on damages,' 0 5 or in characterizing
an issue as law or fact for Rule 52 review, a chore readily confused with the
directed verdict debate over whether an issue must be submitted to a jury. ' 0 6
Yet to the extent the issue is analogized to the right to a jury trial on a given
issue, the Supreme Court has nonetheless made clear in other contexts that
the jury-right issue is federal. 10 7
Further, a disproportionate number of such state-test cases were authored
by district judges sitting by designation. This is noted not because district
judges are generally more prone to error but rather because reflexive resort
to state phrasings is, to a district court, both common habit and usually
correct at trial, as contrasted with a nonjury appeal standard. Trial tests are
often state substance.10 8
At any rate, these and similar state-law-in-passing cases are not cited
again for their state review tests, so that they stand relatively alone even in
be reviewed for clear error. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 792 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir.
1986); Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353, 1354, 1357 n.3, 1358 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying
substantive law of state of injury but reviewing damages under Rule 52, finding clear error);
Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1968).
99. See supra note 74.
100. See In re American Casualty Co., 851 F.2d 794, 798, 800 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying
Michigan rule that "whether damages are adequately proved is a question of law," and Rule 52
is inapplicable; yet earlier emphasizing that Rule 52 provides the standard to review contract
findings).
101. Ma v. Community Bank, 686 F.2d 459, 467 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 962
(1982).
102. See id. (relying on the state rule for jury trials).
103. Cf. Molzof v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 711, 718 (1992) (remanding for lower court to
determine, in FTCA case, the recoverability at all of punitive damages under Wisconsin law).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 131-37; cf Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341,
346 n.1 (4th Cir. 1982) (what plaintiffs needed to prove is state law, but whether they proved it
is federal procedure).
105. See infra text accompanying notes 143-49; cf. Howard v. Green, 555 F.2d 178, 182-83
(8th Cir. 1977) (holding that damages finding is discretionary but reviewed for clear error).
106. See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72, § 3.09. Use of state law-fact characteriza-
tion may be more defensible since it may involve fringes of substantive law in applying Rule 52
rather than the mere applicability of the rule. However, it does define the rule's applicability
and is thus still a standards-of-review issue in the Rule 52 context. See id. Analogy to the
submission-to-jury situation is not helpful - though often confused as in Downs and Madrid.
107. See infra notes 304 and 405.
108. See, e.g., Warner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1347, 1351 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984)
(stating that "burden of proof, presumptions, and privileges may be matters of state law").
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their own circuits. 10 9 In addition, they often seem harmless on their own
terms when state standards are similar to federal ones in nonjury trials.110
Even when confusion is understandable or harmless, it is likely that future
courts will settle the Rule 52 debate properly in favor of the federal test,
either by continuing to apply Rule 52 without comment or by disavowing
the occasional case which ignores the federal clearly erroneous rule. The
aberrant cases, in any event, hardly support the conclusion that there is a
real conflict in the courts over the use of a federal review rule in nonjury
cases.
D. REVIEW OF MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
Rule 59 authorizes a district court to grant a new trial to either party on
any or all issues, usually in a jury trial."'I In such cases, the judge may
order a new trial "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore
been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." ' 1 2 Mo-
tions for new trial are commonly based on such grounds as legal error (e.g.,
in instructions or evidence calls); improper conduct of judge, attorney, or
juror; new evidence; unfair surprise; and verdict contrary to the evidence.' '1
The trial court's decision is generally committed to its discretion. 14 How
the abuse of discretion standard plays out in each context depends in turn on
the circumstances of each case, the type of alleged error underlying the mo-
tion, and the traditional applications to that context.' 15 For example, courts
have indicated that the standard actually varies as between grants or denials
109. See, e.g., Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353, 1357 (10th Cir. 1981) (not citing
Madrid or Royer).
110. See, e.g., Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 173 (8th Cir.
1971); Madrid v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 486 F.2d 856, 858 (10th Cir. 1973). But cf
Byram v. United States, 705 F.2d 1418, 1421 (5th Cir. 1983) (law-fact characterization may be
decisive); Ma v. Community Bank, 686 F.2d 459, 467 (7th Cir.) (appears determinative), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 962 (1982).
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 59. Rule 59(a) provides that the motion can also be granted in non-
jury trials (on grounds for rehearings in former equity practice). In such cases the court's
decision to change its mind may be treated as discretionary, but ultimately the findings are
reviewed for clear error under Rule 52(a); the federal rule clearly applies. See supra notes 71-
94. This discussion applies to the motion's far more common application in jury trials.
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1). The court's power to order a new trial despite a jury verdict
has been found consistent with the Seventh Amendment. See 6A MOORE & LUCAS, supra note
43, 59.04[2].
113. See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 571 & n.2 (5th Cir.) (admission of irrelevant
evidence; argument; proof of damages; weight of evidence), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 277 (1991);
Coursey v. Broadhurst, 888 F.2d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 1989) (denying mistrial on improper argu-
ment); Warner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1347, 1353 (8th Cir. 1984) (new evidence);
Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 687 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1982) (unfair surprise).
114. E.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940); Ryan v. McDonough
Power Equip., Inc., 734 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1984); Bunch v. United States, 680 F.2d 1271,
1282 (9th Cir. 1982).
115. "The" abuse of discretion standard, applied in many contexts, is not a monolith;
courts vary it in significant ways. See International Paper Co. v. Town of Jay, 887 F.2d 338,
344 (1st Cir. 1989); Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 27-29 (2d Cir. 1983); Steven A.
Childress, A Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 125 F.R.D. 319, 336-38, 345
(1989); Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173 (1978).
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of the motion,' 16 and as between such grounds as weight of the evidence and
improper argument. " 7
New trial based on the lack of evidentiary support, also reviewed on the
whole record for some form of abuse, I" actually places both the district and
circuit courts into a review posture."19 Review involves the weight of the
evidence, not really its sufficiency (a term of art for judgment as a matter of
law, directed verdict, or j.n.o.v.). Both types of motions are similar in that
they permit review, at least indirectly, of the factual basis of the verdict. 120
Nevertheless, their respective Erie rules have varied openly in the circuits.
In most circuits, the new trial motion has invoked federal procedures and
standards in diversity cases, 121 though such courts have had occasional nota-
ble instances of reciting state tests, 122 usually by ignoring the more settled
application of federal standards. 123
The federal-standard rule is applied even in some circuits which apply
state jury tests on jury sufficiency of the evidence motions. 124 Such a dichot-
116. See Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984); Conway, 687
F.2d at 112 & n.4 (abuse test generally, but review is somewhat broader over grants); Massey
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir.) (when judge confirms jury, all factors press in
favor of affirming denial), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838 (1975).
117. Massey, 508 F.2d at 95 (closer scrutiny over new trial granted on weight of evidence
than when judge finds a pernicious influence had intruded into case).
118. See, e.g., Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 & n.3 (1980); Davlan v.
Otis Elev. Co., 816 F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1987); Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514, 1519
(9th Cir. 1987); Westbrook v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1241 (5th Cir.
1985); Saunders v. Chatham County Bd. of Comm'rs, 728 F.2d 1367, 1368 (11 th Cir. 1984);
Vander Zee v. Karabatsos, 589 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979);
Lewin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 394 F.2d 608, 614 (3d Cir. 1968).
119. Appellate review is for the judge's abuse, tested by whether the jury's verdict is con-
trary to the "great weight of the evidence," while the district court reviews the jury more
directly using a great weight or similar test. For Erie purposes, the cases do not draw a distinc-
tion based on which form or level of review is at issue.
120. See infra notes 419-21 and accompanying text. In what they review, the two seem
somewhat closer than new trial motions based on nonevidentiary grounds, though the differ-
ence in review is that of law versus discretion.
121. E.g., Romero v. International Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1449 (10th Cir. 1992);
Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1992); Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947
F.2d 95, 107 (4th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 986 & n.2 (5th Cir.
1989); Westbrook v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985); Lowe v.
General Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980); see Neely v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 345- 46 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing); 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2802 (1973) (citing cases).
122. See, e.g., Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1446-47 (11 th Cir.
1991) (court "look[s] to Georgia law to determine whether the verdict is excessive," though
federal law provides review of new trial for such excessiveness; cites abuse of discretion test); In
re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans on July 9, 1982, 767 F.2d 1151, 1165-67 (5th Cir.
1985) (Tate, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for apparently comparing state cases'
awards; court should reject outright the contention that state law provides a review test in
federal court since cases are settled).
123. See, e.g., McKinzie v. Fleming, 588 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 1979); Givens v. Lederle,
556 F.2d 1341, 1344 (5th Cir. 1977).
124. See Allison v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 1187, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992) (as amended);
Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1274 (1993); J.C. Wyckoff& Assocs. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1487 n.20 (6th
Cir. 1991); Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1989); Davlan v. Otis Elev. Co., 816
F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1987); Arms v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 731 F.2d 1245, 1248 & n.2
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omy is presented as not really as inconsistent as it might seem,1 25 even when
both raise issues of the level of evidence needed to approve a verdict. Review
of jury verdicts on a motion for sufficiency of the evidence poses a question
of law, so it may sound more substantive and state-generated than does the
traditional federal discretion given for new trial motions; further, new trial
goes to the fairness and acceptability of the proceedings, even with claims
about the weight of the evidence, so it may seem more "procedural" than the
legal sufficiency of a claim. The distinction is not wholly convincing. 26 At
any rate, some courts attempt an apparent compromise by reciting both state
and federal new trial language or applying the federal test while finding the
state test to be "instructive."' 27
The Eighth Circuit employs the federal standard and adds that, in apply-
ing it, the district court "should consider, among all other factors, the result
that would be reached in the state's courts" under the state's own test. 128 A
few Eighth Circuit cases say, however, that while the procedural standards
of a new trial motion are specified by federal law, state law controls on the
issue of whether the amount of the verdict is excessive. 129 The latter lan-
guage appears to be a minor aberration from the more consistent recitation
of a federal test, or a federal test informed by state factors, and is at any rate
no longer viable under more recent Supreme Court precedent. 130
In 1989, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. ,31 the
Supreme Court addressed the Erie issue of which test controls review of a
jury award under Rule 59. The Court held that such a damages review is
controlled by federal law, while state law governs factors the jury may con-
sider (apparently considered by the court in then reviewing the new trial
decision): "In reviewing an award of punitive damages, the role of the Dis-
trict Court is to determine whether the jury's verdict is within the confines
set by state law, and to determine, by reference to federal standards devel-
oped under Rule 59, whether a new trial or remittitur should be ordered."'
32
At bottom, however, appellate review in federal courts is by an abuse of
(6th Cir. 1984) (in j.n.o.v. appeal, distinguishing Sixth Circuit rule on new trial as federal);
General Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 695 F.2d 281, 288 (7th Cir. 1982);
LaForest v. Autoridad de las Fuentes Fluviales, 536 F.2d 443, 447 (1st Cir. 1976); Galard v.
Johnson, 504 F.2d 1198, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1974); cf. Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods,
Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 971-72 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding excessiveness under federal or state rule).
125. See generally Abernathy, 704 F.2d at 970-71 (arguing for possible reconciliation of
circuit's rules on jury review), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 216-20.
126. See infra notes 417-22 and accompanying text.
127. E.g., Humble v. Mountain State Constr: Co., 441 F.2d 816, 820 (6th Cir. 1971). A
similarly vague "neutral" principle is criticized infra text accompanying notes 279-81.
128. Novak v. Gramm, 469 F.2d 430, 434 (8th Cir. 1972) (that result is "only one of the
guides" on appeal in deciding whether the judge abused discretion). Later Eighth Circuit cases
continue this approach. See, e.g., Nodak Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 533 F.2d 401 (8th Cir.
1976); see also Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 1984) (highest
award places substantive limit on federal court).
129. See, e.g., Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541 F.2d 713, 721 (8th Cir. 1976).
130. It seems more consistent with the circuit's approach to sufficiency review. See infra
text accompanying note 273.
131. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
132. Id. at 279; see also O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1448 (10th
Cir. 1987) (applying similar analysis), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
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discretion standard, which accords "considerable deference to a district
court's decision not to order a new trial."1 33
In this context the role of state law is not wholly absent, since it may
"trickle up" to be part of the jury's factfinding package that is then reviewed
under federal law. But the Court's approach and reasoning1 34 does seem to
reject those lower court cases which placed a greater reliance on state prac-
tice (or just applied a state test). Even the Eighth Circuit's interjection of a
state's "result" as one "factor" on appeal may overstate state law's influence,
giving it more weight in the appellate balancing process than simply al-
lowing it to set wide perimeters.1 35
Although the specific complaint in Browning-Ferris was the excessiveness
of punitive damages awarded by the jury, this issue arose by way of a new
trial/remittitur process, 136 and the Court did not purport to limit its holding
to new trial on damages as such. 137 It is thus apparent that similar analysis
would be used as to more general new trial motions. If any difference sur-
faces, it would probably be to remove the state factors as influencing in any
way the review of verdicts contrary to the evidence, in line with earlier cases
which had not discussed state law in any way as to such a review process.
At the least the case does not support grounding the review in state law.
Courts of appeals should generally look to the federal standard on review
of all new trial motions. By analogy to Browning-Ferris, the federal review
process may in some contexts take into account the defining limits of parallel
state practice, but the review test is not state law. The most difficult question
remaining from Browning-Ferris and related cases specifying the limits of
punitive damages generally 38 is not really about review but rather jury in-
struction in the first instance: the federal courts now must decide the extent
to which federal juries must be charged as to state law on damages, in order
to promote their legitimate consideration of such "factors" 139 and to allow
meaningful constitutional jury decisionmaking about damages. 140 Even if
133. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 280 (footnote omitted).
134. The Court drew on precedent about appellate review broader than new trial. See infra
text accompanying note 316.
135. Some lower court cases now focus the role of state law on the federaljury charge, see
infra note 140, such that it affects appellate review only through that conduit.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 142-52.
137. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279 (broadly discussing new trial review). Indeed, all
of the Court's stated policies and justifications apply even more readily to the general new trial
context; over the years the harder question has been the interweaving of state law on damages,
see supra notes 105 and 129, whereas verdicts contrary to the evidence have more uncontrover-
sially received review by a federal test.
138. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (verdict's alleged
excessiveness does not present a Fourteenth Amendment due process problem since meaning-
ful standard of review exists in Alabama to ensure proper judicial oversight). Haslip is not
clear how meaningful or independent that review must be. However, a majority of the Court
now apparently believes that traditional reasonableness review over punitive damages will suf-
fice to justify the award of very high punitive damages as against a procedural due process
challenge. See TXO Productions Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711. (1993).
139. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279 (quoted above).
140. See generally Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc),
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 199-203.
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the Court is not entirely clear how the state's factors are considered and has
not spelled out all the implications of its rulings, it has purported to settle
the appellate review standard for new trials: review of any such decision is
overarchingly federal. 141
E. NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES AND REMITTITUR
Similar review rules apply when a jury's assessment of damages is re-
viewed through a new trial motion. This may be done, in federal courts, by
seeking a complete new trial on damages or by seeking remittitur. The latter
is in fact a form of relief ordered on a conditional new trial motion, in which
the judge effectively reduces the damage award by ordering a new trial un-
less the award winner accepts a reduced amount.' 42 Both forms, then, in
effect focus on the weight of the evidence (here, evidence about damages) and
are governed by similar procedures and standards.
The federal trial judge therefore is said to have "discretion" to grant or
deny a motion for new trial based on the excessiveness or inadequacy of the
verdict award, or to order remittitur, much like a review for whether a deci-
sion is based on insufficient evidentiary support. Assuming the trial court's
damages decision may be reviewed at all,' 43 it will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion.'" The courts assess the jury's verdict under several
phrasings, all indicating restraint on review of the jury, 45 and often several
such tests - plus language of passion, prejudice, or arbitrariness - are re-
cited in a single opinion to set up review.' 46
141. E.g., Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 1991) (contrasting
jury charge as state law).
142. In the federal courts the issue usually is one of excessive verdicts - as remedied by
the conditional remittitur vehicle - since additur, for inadequate damages, is held to violate
the Seventh Amendment. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935); Hawkes v.
Ayers, 537 F.2d 836, 837 (5th Cir. 1976). Additur is used in some states and in federal non-
jury trials. Remittitur may be ordered by either a trial judge or an appellate court. Springborn
v. American Commercial Barge Lines, 767 F.2d 89, 96 n.20 (5th Cir. 1985).
143. The question technically is still open. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279 n.25
(Court has not expressly held that courts may review a denial; unnecessary again to reach
question); Comment, Remittitur Review: Constitutionality and Efficiency in Liquidated and
Unliquidated Damage Cases, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 376 (1976). But most courts do assume this
power. Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F.2d 998, 1005 & n.16 (5th Cir.
1982) (all courts now recognize some power to review size of verdicts though Supreme Court
has skirted issue); 6A MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 43, 59.08[6] (surveying cases on former
unreviewability); 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 121, § 2820, at 131 (1973) (discussing
abandonment of no review rule).
144. E.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279 (award of punitive damages); Jowers v. Nation-
wide Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1246, 1255 (11 th Cir. 1987) (reversing a denial as abuse); Goldstein v.
Manhattan Indus., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448 (11 th Cir.) (no abuse found in grant of remittitur but
denial of new trial), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985); Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 192
(3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982).
145. See Sam's Style Shop, 694 F.2d at 1006 (surveying tests courts have used to evaluate
awards and judge's discretion; the panel then found abuse by any of the tests in the judge's
denial of motion and thus ordered conditional new trial); Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guy-
ton, 294 F.2d 439, 447-48 (8th Cir.) (per Blackmun, J.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929 (1961).
146. See 6A MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 43, 59.08[6] (collecting cases).
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A related confusion of contexts 147 causes blending in the language of re-
view, as well as a misfocus on the precise Erie issue up for consideration. 148
It is not clear, for example, that the definition for abuse of discretion in this
context ought to be equated with the jury sufficiency of the evidence test,
especially since new trial is considered discretionary and more easily ob-
tained, theoretically, than a flat reversal of the jury. 149 Even so, the contexts
involve similar enough review processes, if not the same standard, so that
any Erie issue might be decided uniformly. The Browning-Ferris Court is
now clear, at any rate, that trial and appellate court consideration of new
trial awards, however redefined, is to be performed under federal law.
Moreover, settling a conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court in 1977
held that a party that accepts remittitur may not challenge the reduction on
appeal. 150 This appellate waiver rule, the Court specifically held, applies
even in diversity cases. 151 Its Erie reasoning has been interpreted to speak to
appellate review broadly, and not simply its scope of review context. 152
III. REVIEW OF JURY VERDICTS
In the above litigation settings, most of the inconsistencies within and
among circuits are not deep and abiding. Following the Supreme Court's
direct rulings and unquestioned applications, federal law should control all
review aspects of jury instructions, summary judgments, nonjury trials, and
various new trial motions. Most circuits had already adopted this position,
if they focused on it at all. The contrary state-rule cases tend to be rejected
or ignored by later courts, or they will undoubtedly do so in light of recent
Supreme Court direction. Such cases and circuit positions, though glaring
and at times repeated, are on hindsight minor hiccups, and in some instances
can be classified as isolated errors and aberrations. 153
Not so with judicial review of juries, where circuit disagreement is deliber-
ate. Jury review is also the context where the choice of a review rule may
have the most impact. 15 4 Thus, the circuit conflicts are neither isolated nor
147. See Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 506 F.2d 505, 507-09 (8th Cir. 1974) (help-
fully sorting out contexts), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 105 and 129.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 417-22.
150. Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 648-50 (1977) (issue not reviewable
even if given under protest).
151. Id. at 649-50; see, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094 (1986). Some states do not follow Penn Shipping, e.g.,
Life Ins. Co. of Miss. v. Allen, 518 So. 2d 1189, 1194 (Miss. 1987).
152. See infra text accompanying notes 310-18.
153. The possible exception is the state-rule cases on new trials, which may have been
deliberate and settled. They should be re-examined, at any rate, under Browning-Ferris. It is
also clear that the state/federal issue of what jury instructions to give in certain contexts will
become complicated under Haslip.
154. See Planters Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 869, 878 (5th Cir.) (em-phasizing clear differences in state standards in deciding particular cases), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 930 (1967); Arms v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 731 F.2d 1245, 1248-51 (6th Cir. 1984)(state jury test seems decisive in reversing directed verdict); see also Schwimmer v. Sony Corp.
of Am., 459 U.S. 1007, 1009 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (general
choice of jury-review test "will often be influential, if not dispositive," so circuit split "is of far
[Vol. 47
REVIEW AND DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
harmless.
There remains, then, the most problematic Erie issue in judicial review:
the standard for sufficiency of the evidence for a jury to reach a verdict or
make a finding of fact.155 Sufficiency must be contrasted with an allegation
that a verdict or finding is against the weight of the evidence and thus justi-
fies a new trial. 156 Instead, sufficiency is raised at trial through a motion for
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50,157 a two-step procedure formerly
named directed verdict and judgment n.o.v.,158 and is challenged on appeal
by way of review over the district judge's decision on the motion made below
for judgment as a matter of law. Before this article analyzes the applicability
of a federal test in diversity cases, a brief review of that general test is in
order, to bring the diversity rule into sharper relief.
A. THE JURY TEST FOR SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The trial judge may only direct a verdict, grant judgment n.o.v., or grant
judgment as a matter of law if there is no sufficient evidentiary basis for the
jury to decide otherwise; the appellate court may affirm the trial judge's deci-
sion only if the evidence likewise fails to support a contrary jury verdict.159
Whether the evidence is "sufficient" must be made by some threshold mea-
sure of acceptability, as applied to whatever part of the record is to be re-
viewed for its sufficiency by that measure. Both inquiries - the test of
review and the materials reviewed - combine to define the relevant stan-
dard of review. 160 In the typical civil jury trial, the first aspect of the stan-
dard used to test the jury's decision is some form of a reasonable jury
measure,16 ' stated in a variety of ways. 162 In assessing the evidence, all rea-
more than academic interest"); 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, WORKS 156 (J. Bowring ed. 1962) (as to
different reviews of criminal factfindings, "it is manifest ... how considerable between them
... might be the difference in point of effect"). A glaring example of this impact is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 252-56.
155. Federal juries may make specific findings of fact short of a general verdict through the
district court's use of alternative verdict practices, such as interrogatories. The choice and
process of such special interrogatories and alternatives, as well as the test for review, is pre-
scribed by federal law. See supra text accompanying notes 43-54.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
158. The two steps and their stem rules of timing and specificity required to challenge
evidentiary sufficiency are in fact strengthened by the 1991 amendment to Rule 50, as de-
scribed in Steven A. Childress, Judgment as a Matter of Law: A Preterise of Consistency, A
Return to Technicality (1994) (unpublished manuscript available from author).
159. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 50; Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (en,
banc).
160. See generally 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72, § 1.01 (analyzing two aspects of a
standard of review: the test applied, and the materials to which it is applied).
161. See, e.g., Ellison v. Conoco, Inc., 950 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 3003 (1993); FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (1991) (adopting test long articulated in cases: "no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that party...").
162. Courts use different versions, all apparently meaning much the same thing. Such
forms include "reasonable juror," "reasonable man," "reasonable conflict," "reasonable
minds," and "one reasonable conclusion." See Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d
230, 241 (4th Cir. 1982) (variations may be semantic lapses); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d
365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (discussing phrasings); 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note
72, § 3.01 (collecting various phrasings).
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sonable inferences must be taken as resolved in favor of the nonmoving party
or the jury's verdict. 163 Less settled is the proper set of materials reviewed:
the test is applied to a part or all of the record, depending on the circuit in
which the case arises. 164
The appellate court's review, in turn, is de novo:1 65 no deference is given
to the trial court's ruling whether it granted or denied the jury motion. 166
Thus, the same actual standard is applied to test the jury itseltP67 - a rea-
sonableness measure acting on some set of evidence - with the trial court's
intermediate decision virtually taken out of the appellate review process.
The appellate standard technically is de novo, but its usual review over the
federal jury is deferential in exactly the same way as the trial judge's review.
The reasonableness test, then, is seen as the standard of review (at least, re-
view of the jury) both at trial and on appeal, whatever portion of the record
to which the test is applied. 168
The reasonableness test itself, again in the usual jury case, is often restated
in terms of requiring "substantial evidence" to support a verdict, 169 as con-
trasted with an any evidence or complete absence measure no longer seen as
providing the proper test in typical federal cases. 170 The latter, more strin-
gent test remains in Jones Act and Federal Employers' Liability Act 1' jury
163. Eg., Turner v. Purina Mills, Inc., 989 F.2d 1419, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993); Allison v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir. 1992); Romero v. International Harvester
Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1449 (10th Cir. 1992); Santiago-Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865 F.2d 431,
445 (1st Cir. 1989); DeWitt v. Brown, 669 F.2d 516, 523 (8th Cir. 1982).
164. See Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 459 U.S. 1007, 1009 (1982) (White, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari) (collecting cases on circuit conflict on the jury review standard
generally); I CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72, § 3.03 (analyzing conflicting circuit stan-
dards, especially as to what body of evidence is reviewed under the test).
165. E.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 540 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 304 (1993); Romero, 979 F.2d at 1449 (de novo since same standard as district
court); Allison, 979 F.2d at 1195; Trzcinski v. American Casualty Co., 953 F.2d 307, 313, 315
(7th Cir. 1992); Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Lavender, 934 F.2d 290, 293 (11 th Cir. 1991); Pro-
teus Books Ltd. v. Cherry Lane Music Co., 873 F.2d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 1989).
166. E.g., The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988); Diebold v.
Moore McCormack Bulk Transp. Lines, 805 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1986); Ellis v. Chevron
U.S.A., 650 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1981); Dulin v. Circle F Indus., 558 F.2d 456, 465 (8th Cir.
1977).
167. E.g., Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 124-25 (1st Cir. 1992); Rotondo
v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992); Miles v. Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co.,
862 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11 th Cir. 1989); Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 680 (10th
Cir. 1981).
168. In general cases, then, the principal unsettled issue is whether the courts look to the
whole record in reviewing the jury, or only to that part which supports its decision. This issue
certainly may be intertwined with the applicable test itself, so that partial-record courts may be
more likely to apply a more minimal threshold of sufficient evidence. See I CHILDRESS &
DAVIS, supra note 72, § 3.03.
169. E.g., DeMaine v. Bank One, Akron, N.A., 904 F.2d 219, 220 (4th Cir. 1990); Venegas
v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 1987); Koch v. Secretary of Dept. of HEW, 590 F.2d
260, 261 (8th Cir. 1978) ("the essential question"); Boeing Co., 411 F.2d at 370 (discussing
consistency of substantial evidence with reasonableness test).
170. See Cooper, supra note 7, at 924-27; 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 49, §§ 2524
n.30, 2529 n.43; I CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72, § 3.03.
171. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988); Federal Emp. Liab. Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
These statutory schemes are usually regarded the same as to their jury review rules. See, e.g.,
WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 95, at 642-43.
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cases. 172 It is also used in some states (at least in certain contexts), notably
Wisconsin, 173 North Carolina,174 Georgia, 17 5 and Tennessee.' 76  Texas
courts often use the language of no evidence, 177 but by this - in most proce-
dural contexts - they apparently mean "legally insufficient evidence,"
which in many instances works out to be much like a federal reasonableness
standard; 178 even so, some aspects of review under Texas law (especially a
requirement that the reviewing court look only to the nonmovant's evidence
172. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957) (Jones Act com-
plete absence test); Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946) (same for F.E.L.A.); Boeing Co.,
411 F.2d at 370-73 (distinguishing usual federal standard of review from Jones Act review).
The reasonableness test does not apply the same (if at all) in Jones Act and F.E.L.A. cases;
the standard of review changes in order to promote the policies of these statutory protection
schemes. A jury verdict on negligence for the plaintiff must be upheld against a defendant's
motion if any evidence, here called "slight evidence," supports it. See Robin v. Wilson Bros.
Drilling, 719 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Bryant, 671 F.2d 1276, 1279 (11 th Cir.
1982); Robert Force, Allocation of Risk and Standard of Care Under the Jones Act: "Slight
Negligence," "Slight Care"?, 25 J. MAR. L. & COM. - (forthcoming 1994) (examining impli-
cations of rule to jury charge).
The usual reasonableness standard may, however, apply when a plaintiff's motion seeking an
instructed verdict in his favor is reviewed. See Springborn v. American Commercial Barge
Lines, 767 F.2d 89, 99-100 (5th Cir. 1985) (settling question for circuit); Steven A. Childress &
Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of Review - FELA and Jones Act Cases, 4 MAR. L. REP.
88 (1992) (examining Jones Act review and exceptions for seaworthiness claims and plaintiffs'
motions). This article, at any rate, focuses on the reasonableness test used in general civil
litigation.
173. See Allison, 979 F.2d at 1193-96 (reciting Wisconsin directed verdict test of "no credi-
ble evidence" or "any evidence," and noting distinction for j.n.o.v. test, which does not permit
sufficiency review at all) (citing Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., 469 N.W.2d 595 (Wis.
1991)).
174. See DeMaine, 904 F.2d at 220 (contrasting North Carolina scintilla decisions).
175. See LaRoche Indus., Inc. v. AIG Risk Mgmt., Inc., 959 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir.
1992) (describing Georgia law on jury award of attorneys'fees: "absolutely no evidence").
176. See Truan v. Smith, 578 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Tenn. 1979); Kaley ex rel. Lanham v. Union
Planters Nat'l Bank, 775 S.W.2d 607, 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Finch v. Monumental Life
Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 1426, 1430 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Truan and TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d)); Gold
v. National Savings Bank, 641 F.2d 430, 434 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
177. E.g., Porterfield v. Brinegar, 719 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1986) ("The trial court may
properly withdraw a case from the jury and instruct a verdict only if there is no evidence to
support a material issue."); Seideneck v. Cal Bayreuther Assocs., 451 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex.
1970) (reviewing no evidence point of error and affirming instructed verdict issued at close of
plaintiff's case, even though "the question of whether there is more than a scintilla of evidence
to support the finding of a vital fact is close"); see also Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d
982, 986 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting counsel's argument under Texas law that verdict can be
overturned only if no evidence supports it).
178. See Seideneck, 451 S.W.2d at 755 (stating that perhaps there is a "glimmer of evidence
to support the plaintiff's position" but "when the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so
weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, such evidence is
in legal effect no evidence" not supporting a verdict) (citing Joske v. Irvine, 44 S.W.2d 1059,
1062 (1898) (any evidence test is "much quoted and often misunderstood;" but test is "not
whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is none that ought reasonably to
satisfy the jury," and that does not include mere surmise)); Jones, 870 F.2d at 986 n.2 (stating
that counsel mischaracterizes Texas rule as scintilla test, at least in the procedural context
raised here); see also Porterfield, 719 S.W.2d at 559 (test is whether "there is any evidence of
probative force to raise a fact issue"); Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.
1989) (reviewing general test for sufficiency of the evidence); William Powers, Jr. & Jack Rat-
liff, Another Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence", 69 TEX. L. REV. 515 (1991)
(thoughtfully analyzing intricate Texas law in this area); W. Wendall Hall, Standards of Appel-
late Review in Civil Appeals, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 865, 899-900, 906-08 (1990) (discussing Texas
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
and reasonable inferences, without review of the whole record) are effectively
more deferential than the typical federal test, 179 so Texas nonetheless should
be included with other states whose review analysis may vary significantly
from, and at times apply more strictly than, federal practice. (Louisiana, by
contrast, is said to have the power of independent review over jury findings
of fact in civil cases,' 80 and other states may adopt more scrutiny over dam-
age awards in order to address a growing concern that awards are too
high.) 181
Whatever the "usual" federal standard to review civil juries - and
whether that standard is as settled as commentators and the 1991 amend-
ment to Rule 50 make it seem' 82 - the issue remains whether that general
sufficiency review, sorting out procedural contexts which raise different applications of it, and
helpfully providing illustrations of jury review process and inferences).
As such sources indicate, the Texas tests are far more complex than simply a scintilla rule -
despite use of no evidence as the stated scope or standard of review - and are still obviously
misunderstood.
179. See, e.g., $56,700 in U.S. Currency v. State, 730 S.W.2d 659, 661-62 (Tex. 1987) (in
considering no evidence point of error, the court must consider only the supporting evidence
and inferences and disregard contrary evidence and inferences; further, when circumstantial
evidence gives rise to equally probable inferences, neither fact is proved, and here no more than
a scintilla supports necessary finding); Porterfield, 719 S.W.2d at 559 (in applying test of "any
evidence of probative force," court must consider all evidence in light favoring verdict, "dis-
carding all the contrary evidence and inferences"); Seideneck, 451 S.W.2d at 756 (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority for not properly invoking rule that requires appeal to consider
only evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to plaintiff); Hall, supra note 178, at 907-08
(discussing application of one side only rule and other differences from federal review). In
turn, appellate review may vary according to which party had the burden of proof on this
issue. See id at 906-08.
180. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (La. 1979) ("In Louisiana courts of
appeal have full and complete jurisdiction to review facts."). This is more a direction as to the
scope of review, including the appellate court's power to enter its own findings of fact, since
Louisiana courts are still instructed to give deference to juries (under a standard of manifest
error, which is less strict than reasonableness review). See id. at 1333-34; Lirette v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 563 So. 2d 850, 852-53 (La. 1990). See generally David W. Robertson, Appellate
Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 21 LA. L. REV. 402 (1961).
181. Cf Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (describing Alabama review
of punitive damage awards, which considers independent criteria of review and even considera-
tion of new evidence). Some states have responded to Haslip by giving their appellate courts
more independent review of punitive damages, presumably to avoid the Court's due process
questions. See, e.g., Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1991)
(describing changes to South Carolina post-verdict review after Haslip). It is not clear that
such appellate scrutiny is required, in light of the newer opinions in TXO Production Corp. v.
Allied Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
182. In a forthcoming article, I argue that the jury test is still unsettled, a reality belied by
both recent commentary and the advisory notes to the 1991 amendment. Although most
courts do seem to use a substantial evidence measure (in applying the universally accepted
reasonableness review), there is still some question in a firm min6rity of courts as to whether
the judges should examine both sides of the evidence in applying the reasonableness threshold.
See Steven A. Childress, Judgment as a Matter of Law: A Pretense of Consistency, A Return
to Technicality (1994) (unpublished manuscript available from author).
Nevertheless, for purposes of the Erie rule analyzed in this article, it suffices to note the
existence of this diverse treatment within the circuits without resolving the split. Here, the
issue is whether each circuit's general federal test will apply the same in its diversity cases (not
what its federal test exactly is), even if that general application may subtly differ among cir-
cuits.
Portions of the following analysis in part III are developed and expanded from I CHILDRESS
& DAVIS, supra note 72, § 3.08.
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test will also apply, or be applied in the same manner, in cases arising under
state law. On that issue, the circuits are openly in conflict, though it is clear
in all courts that Erie means that state law, of course, provides the substan-
tive rules and legal tests, controlling federal judges and juries. l8 3
B. THE MAJORITY RULE: FEDERAL STANDARDS APPLY
A majority of courts today, after early inconsistency in some circuits,184
expressly apply their federal sufficiency test of reasonableness discussed
above even in diversity and other state law cases, both at trial and on appeal.
This application is now firmly settled in the Fourth, 18 5 Fifth, 8 6 Ninth, 8 7
Tenth, 88 and Eleventh 8 9 Circuits.
183. E.g., Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 227 (1991); Simler v. Conner, 372
U.S. 221, 222 (1963); Turner v. Purina Mills, Inc., 989 F.2d 1419, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993); Tioga
Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 917-18 (8th Cir. 1993); Rotondo v. Keene
Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992).
184. See generally Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 368-69 & nn.2-4 (5th Cir. 1969)
(en banc) (discussing inconsistent cases within and among circuits); Wratchford v. S.J. Groves
& Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1067-68 (4th Cir. 1969) (same); Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co.,
315 F.2d 335, 342 (2d Cir. 1963) (same); Cooper, supra note 7, at 973-74 & n.212 (lack of
Court guidance has predictably led to splits among and within circuits).
185. Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 100, 107 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing
sufficiency and new trial review on punitive damages); DeMaine v. Bank One, Akron, N.A.,
904 F.2d 219, 220 (4th Cir. 1990); Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 346 (4th Cir. 1982);
Bryan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 565 F.2d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978); Wratchford, 405 F.2d 1067-68 (discussing issue in detail); Sum-
mers v. Watkins Motor Lines, 323 F.2d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1963).
186. Thrash v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 992 F.2d 1354, 1356 (5th Cir. 1993); Ayres v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1173, 1175 (5th Cir. 1986); McCandless v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 779 F.2d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 798 F.2d 163 (1986);
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1143 (5th Cir. 1985); Foster v. Ford
Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1980); Coastal Plains Feeders v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 545 F.2d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Ellison v. Conoco, Inc., 950 F.2d 1196, 1203
n.8 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that Louisiana law applies in action under Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331, but sufficiency test is federal; cites diversity cases), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 3003 (1993); Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 986 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1989)
(discussing sufficiency of evidence diversity rule in new trial context).
187. Miller v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986); Bank of
Cal., N.A. v. Opie, 663 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); see Sankovich v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
638 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that Ninth Circuit uses federal test for sufficiency of
evidence, such as j.n.o.v. and directed verdict, in diversity cases; here applied in summaryjudgment context); Neely v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 345 & nn.2-3 (9th
Cir. 1978) (finding Arizona testused substantially similar, and noting circuit conflict and prior
inconsistent Ninth Circuit cases, court looks to federal test of sufficiency of evidence; here,
discussed in summary judgment context).
188. Orth v. Emerson Elec. Co., 980 F.2d 632, 635 (10th Cir. 1992); Romero v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1449 (10th Cir. 1992); McKinney v. Gannett Co., 817
F.2d 659, 663 (10th Cir. 1987); Peterson v. Hager, 724 F.2d 851, 853 (10th Cir. 1984) (on
rehearing); Hidalgo Properties v. Wachovia Mortgage Co., 617 F.2d 196, '198 (10th Cir. 1980);
Yazzie v. Sullivent, 561 F.2d 183, 188 (10th Cir. 1977); Oldenburg v. Clark, 489 F.2d 839, 841
(10th Cir. 1974) (jury review and new trial motion).
189. Jones v. Miles Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1576, 1578 (11th Cir. 1989); Miles v. Tennessee
River Pulp & Paper Co., 862 F.2d 1525, 1527-28 (11th Cir. 1989); Federal Kempler Life
Assurance Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 712 F.2d 459, 464 (11 th Cir. 1983); Daniels v. Twin Oaks
Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1982). But cf LaRoche Indus., Inc. v. AIG
Risk Mgmt., Inc., 959 F.2d 189, 193 (11 th Cir. 1992) (using Georgia review test over award of
attorneys' fees even though issue is framed as review ofj.n.o.v. motion).
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The federal-test rule applies similarly in the District of Columbia, 190
though often there the local law is federal district law anyway. 191 Although
the Rules of Decision Act does not require the circuit to follow Erie, the
court has long held that Erie's principles are to be followed analogously by
federal courts hearing diversity claims in the district. 192 Nevertheless, it is
apparent that a jury review test will be provided by federal, not district,
law. 193
The Fifth Circuit's occasional justification for the majority rule is illustra-
tive: any effort to interweave state sufficiency rules into jury review "must be
rejected as attempts to apply state procedural rules to the judge-jury rela-
tionship in federal court."194 The court thus clarifies: "What they needed to
prove to make a jury case is, of course, to be measured by [state] substantive
law. Whether they proved such a case is a matter of federal procedural law
... .-195 In fact, that court met en banc to resolve the Erie issue in a
landmark case, Boeing Co. v. Shipman,196 famous more for establishing the
substantial evidence test and whole-record review generally in civil cases, re-
placing a scintilla or complete absence standard sometimes used previously in
that circuit. 197
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit is clear that a federal court sitting in diver-
sity "must also apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, therefore,
must review the jury verdict under standards established by" Rule 50(b) and
its substantial evidence test. 198 This is so even though its judges recently met
en banc to consider the proper instructions to be given a federal jury in de-
ciding state-law punitive damages, and disagreed strongly about that is-
sue. 199 The majority found that, consistent with Erie, state review standards
and the factors used to guide review of punitive damage awards (though not
applying on appeal in federal court) must be incorporated into the jury
charge used to inform the federal jury of the limits of its discretion under
190. See Wilson v. Good Humor Corp., 757 F.2d 1293, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applying
federal test). Of course, the D.C. Circuit may not face diversity issues in the usual way of the
state-based courts, but it interprets district law, see id. at 1301 n.6, and at times the D.C.
Circuit is even asked to interpret state law. E.g., Waters v. American Auto Ins. Co., 363 F.2d
684, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (refusing to defer to other federal court interpretation).
191. See Poole v. Kelly, 954 F.2d 760, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("under prevailing princi-
ples of federal-local law, the district court basically sits as a local court").
192. Id. at 763 (quoting Steorts v. American Airlines, 647 F.2d 194, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
193. See Wilson, 757 F.2d at 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See generally Association of Am.
R.Rs. v. ICC, 600 F.2d 989, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (generally state substantive law creates
underlying rights and duties, while federal law governs evidence, pleading, and practice).
194. Owens v. International Paper Co., 528 F.2d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1976). Such policy
arguments are analyzed infra text accompanying notes 385-95. Usually the majority courts
merely recite their rule without further explanation, just as minority state-test courts tend
simply to cite their cases without really analyzing the underlying Erie dilemma.
195. Owens, 528 F.2d at 609 (emphasis in original) (affirming directed verdict); accord Fitz-
gerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 346 n.1 (4th Cir. 1982).
196. 411 F.2d 365, 368-70 & nn.2-4 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
197. See id. at 370-73.
198. Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 1991) (contrasting jury
charge as state substance).
199. Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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state law.200 Dissenting judges criticized this hybrid-charge remedy as too
creative or usurpatious under Erie,201 and it may be that in other courts its
manipulation of charge substance will be found to violate Erie or at least
presents an enigmatic loophole from the reasoning in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip.20 2 Nevertheless, apparently there is no question
that post-trial review of the verdict, on damages and more broadly, is con-
trolled by federal tests and the Seventh Amendment. 20 3
In all these courts, state law is said to provide the underlying cause of
action and the substance of the parties' arguments,2°4 including such tricky
issues - arguably similar to review standards - as the standard of proof at
trial and doctrines like res ipsa loquitur.20 5 As the Fifth Circuit has distin-
guished, federal standards are used to test the insufficiency of the evidence in
relation to the verdict, but the court refers to state law in diversity cases for
the kind of evidence that must be produced to support the verdict. 20 6 How-
200. Id. at 1415-18.
201. Id. at 1421 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (noting that Haslip does not "convert" factors
for excessiveness review, "traditionally reserved for the court," into "a jury question"); id. at
1424 (stating that the majority wrongly imposes "what are essentially federal jury instructions
on state punitive damages"); id. (Luttig, J., dissenting in part) (stating that the majority
wrongly constitutionalizes Alabama law and imposes it on Virginia); id. at 1433 (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting) (noting the court's substitution of federal law for Virginia punitive damages law,
leaving different jury charge in state and federal courts, in violation of Erie).
202. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). Haslip may inevitably raise this anomaly since it referred to Ala-
bama's freer review of awards as supporting its acceptability against due process complaints,
yet federal review is controlled by the Seventh Amendment. See Mattison, 947 F.2d at 99
(discussing). On the other hand, Haslip may support the minority rule using state jury stan-
dards precisely because the anomaly is avoided by using state-rule review in federal courts in
states which, like Alabama, provide acceptably intrusive review. That possibility (though at
this point a rare combination) may nonetheless violate Browning-Ferris, as analyzed infra in
text accompanying notes 312-17. See also supra note 138 (discussing Haslip's progeny).
203. See also Defender Indus., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502, 504-
05 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (discussing judgment n.o.v. and new trial review).
204. E.g., Romero v. International Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1449 (10th Cir. 1992)
(noting that Colorado provides substantive law but not standard to review jury); Coursey v.
Broadhurst, 888 F.2d 338, 344 (5th Cir. 1989) (recognizing Mississippi law on methods of
setting damages to personal property); Peterson v. Hager, 724 F.2d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1984)
(on rehearing) (discussing how to set crop damages in negligence); Montgomery Indus., Int'l,
Inc. v. Thomas Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1980) (questioning whether facts were con-
tract estoppel); Neely v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1978)
(noting elements of cause of action); Reitan v. Travelers Indem. Co., 267 F.2d 66, 69 (7th Cir.
1959) (recognizing causal negligence).
205. See, e.g., Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1982)
(discussing res ipsa and burden of proof); De Marines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d
1193, 1200 (3d Cir. 1978) (discussing burden of proof); see also Warner v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 739 F.2d 1347, 1351 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting burden of proof, presumptions, and privi-
leges arguably are state law, but evidence rules are federal law).
Part of the confusion over a diversity standard of review may stem from unclear mixing of
jury sufficiency questions with similar ones of state law, like whether a certain issue is decided
by jury trial. See infra note 304. It is also clear that a standard of review is not a standard of
proof. See infra text accompanying notes 396-98.
206. Ayres v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1173, 1175 (5th Cir. 1986); McCandless v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 779 F.2d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 798 F.2d
163 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) ("it is the




ever, other special rules dealing with inferences 207 are a sub-application of
the jury sufficiency test and should be governed by federal rules.208
C. MINORITY RULE: APPLICATION OF STATE STANDARDS
In contrast to the majority rule, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits - joined
at times and less consistently by the First Circuit - apply the relevant state
jury standard to review evidentiary sufficiency. The Second, Third, and
Eighth Circuits also have a troubled history of applying or at least discussing
a state review test, but more recently their positions are better described as
continually "mooting" the issue by applying both federal and state standards
in each case. 209 The Federal Circuit presents a quirk of procedure and an
inconsistent history for which a federal rule is the most logical resolution. 210
1. The Seventh Circuit: "Tension" in the Court
As stated, the Seventh Circuit has expressly used a state standard of re-
view for sufficiency of the evidence in many jury cases.21' These state-stan-
dard opinions usually do not discuss older precedent applying a federal test
in that court212 and are generally recognized as providing a settled state rule
207. For example, some states follow a prohibition against pyramiding inferences (piling
one on another to arrive at a conclusion) or a rule that says that equally probable inferences
even if reasonable must be resolved against the party with the burden of proof. See 1 CHIL-
DRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72, § 3.05 (discussing general applicability in federal courts). Such
rules, whether accepted or not (most federal courts don't), are simply part of the larger pack-
age of review for sufficiency of the evidence. Id.; see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-57 (describing
general sufficiency review process, including presumably review of inferences within it, even
while explicitly and separately discussing use of burdens and standards of proof); cf Cooper,
supra note 7, at 983-86 (describing inferences and res ipsa loquitur as bound up in sufficiency
review and therefore applying state test). For Texas law on inferences, see supra note 179.
208. Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1982);
Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1067-68 (4th Cir. 1969); Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y v. Fry, 386 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 1967).
209. See infra text accompanying notes 268-98.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 261-67.
211. E.g., Dolder v. Township of Martinton, 998 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying
Illinois test and reversing grant of j.n.o.v.); Allison v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 1187,
1193-95 (7th Cir. 1992) (Wisconsin tests); Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1182
(7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Sumitomo Corp.
of Am., 971 F.2d 1332, 1341 (7th Cir. 1992); Trzcinski v. American Casualty Co., 953 F.2d
307, 313 (7th Cir. 1992); A. Kush & Assocs. v. American States Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 929 938,
942 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Illinois law); Amplicon Leasing v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 910
F.2d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 1990) (California test); Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's v. General
Accident Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1990); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Standard
Havens, Inc., 901 F.2d 1373, 1382 (Ith Cir. 1990) (Wisconsin law); Goldman v. Fadell, 844
F.2d 1297, 1301 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing cases); Mele v. Sherman Hosp., 838 F.2d 923, 924 (7th
Cir. 1988); Spesco, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 719 F.2d 233, 237 (7th Cir. 1983); Kuziw v. Lake
Eng'g Co., 586 F.2d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1978) (using circular Illinois test that overturns jury only
when such a finding could never stand); Kudelka v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 541 F.2d
651 (7th Cir. 1976); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532
F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1976); Lorance v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 520 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1975);
Risse v. Woodward, 491 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1974).
212. See, e.g., Gudgel v. Southern Shippers, Inc., 387 F.2d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 1967); Reitan
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 267 F.2d 66, 69 (7th Cir. 1959). In fact, in 1971 the court was seen as
settled in favor of federal review. See Cooper, supra note 7, at 974 n.212.
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in the circuit.21 3
On the other hand, it is the established rule in the Seventh Circuit that
motions for new trial (including those based on the weight of the evidence)
are reviewed under its federal test,21 4 despite the similarity of those eviden-
tiary inquiries. 215 In Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc. ,216 Judge Pos-
ner, even while reaffirming the state-standard jury sufficiency test in the face
of the federal new trial rule, characterized this dichotomy as leaving the
court "in some tension."'2 17 Although noting that past opinions tend to ig-
nore both contrary law and possible criticisms, Judge Posner stated that the
position "nevertheless can be defended, and maybe even reconciled .... 218
To this end, he urged that a directed verdict motion perhaps defines the
plaintiff's substantive rights and is not just jury control: "it goes to liability,
not just to amount of damages, and it determines the defendant's right to
judgment and not just to a new trial[;] ' 219 moreover, since excessiveness re-
view goes only one way ("against plaintiffs"), a federal test may "impart a
systemic bias" prompting forum-shopping.220 In any event, in 1983 the
court again noted a possible conflict between these similar review contexts
but still deferred to a state sufficiency test, finding no need to reconsider the
issue or to resolve any inconsistency within the circuit.
22 1
After its public statements of doubt appeared, the court has over the last
decade continued to apply its state-test rule consistently in a series of cases
involving sufficiency of the evidence. 222 Remarkably, these routine applica-
tions nearly always fail to discuss developing Supreme Court precedent that
implies that a federal sufficiency test is applicable 223 or to otherwise urge
modern reconsideration of the rule. One panel that did note developing
Supreme Court precedent simply read it wrong: it actually contrasted the
213. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 92, at 609 n.21.
214. E.g., Allison, 979 F.2d at 1196; Ross, 977 F.2d at 1182; Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d
863, 866 (7th Cir. 1992); Cook v. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684, 687-88 (7th Cir. 1986); Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 295 (7th Cir. 1979); Galard v. Johnson, 504 F.2d 1198, 1200 n.1
(7th Cir. 1974). The Seventh Circuit also finds that jury charge form and manner are federally
prescribed.
215. See infra text accompanying notes 417-22.
216. 704 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1983).
217. Id. at 970. The court cites the Seventh Circuit's federal test for new trial motions and
compares its sufficiency test, calling them related but noting differences. See id. at 970-71.
218. Id. at 971.
219. Id.
220. Id. Still, the court noted that the difference is one of degree only, and likely not
outcome-determinative. Id. Note that Judge Posner's "systemic bias" argument appears to
apply only (or mostly) to excessiveness review, not sufficiency, so it serves better as a reason to
apply state law on new trial for damages than as a justification for distinguishing new trial as
federal law from sufficiency as state law. If so, it does not appear consistent with his goal to
possibly "reconcile" the circuit and in fact justifies a federal sufficiency rule since both parties
may raise that issue. The "bias" argument, to the extent it is an analogy to review of damages
for excessiveness, has also been implicitly answered by the Supreme Court's later holding that
such review is federal law. See supra notes 131-37.
221. Robison v. Lescrenier, 721 F.2d 1101, 1103 & n.I (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey, J.); see also
Davlan v. Otis Elevator Co., 816 F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1987) (contrasting state sufficiency
test and federal new trial test); Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
222. See supra note 211.
223. The recent Supreme Court cases are discussed infra text accompanying notes 310-33.
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Court's rule that jury review considers evidentiary burdens as involving
"federal" law, distinguishing the applicable Illinois review rule. However,
the cited "federal" case, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,224 is federal only
because it was itself treated as a typical diversity case and hardly supports a
distinction as to diversity cases!225
Most of the circuit's applications also ignore its previously-noted tension
regarding the federal new trial test. If both such motions are at issue, recent
cases tend to recite each rule separately and without discussion of any di-
chotomy or of a need to reexamine the entire question. 226
This is so even though use of the state test may be determinative, espe-
cially in diversity actions borrowing state law from jurisdictions which still
apply a scintilla or complete absence rule. 227 The issue nonetheless may be
avoided in many appeals because the most commonly used standard - the
Illinois test of allowing the jury to render a verdict unless all the evidence,
viewed favorably to a verdict, "so overwhelmingly favors movant that no
contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand" 228 - sounds sim-
ilar enough to any federal test the circuit would otherwise employ. 229
2. The Sixth Circuit: Constant Hand- Wringing
The Sixth Circuit has been relatively consistent and straightforward, ap-
plying a state standard of sufficiency review in a long line of cases. 230 In
224. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
225. See infra note 322.
226. See, e.g., Allison, 979 F.2d at 1196 (containing separate section that applies federal
new trial test without relating to opinion's long discussion of state sufficiency test); Ross, 977
F.2d at 1182 (stating both reviews consecutively without noting possible inconsistency).
227. See, e.g., Allison, 979 F.2d at 1193-96 (applying Wisconsin any evidence standard;
limited review test appears decisive). See generally supra notes 173-79.
228. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 229 N.E.2d 504, 514 (Ill. 1967). Panels repeat-
edly cite Pedrick.
229. See, e.g., Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing jury review
generally); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 281 (7th Cir.) (applying whole
record review and substantial evidence measure), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
It is true that the Illinois "could not stand" test has a circularity to it that seems absent in
the federal test. Yet in most cases it appears to be applied much the same as a more typical
reasonableness measure. See, e.g., Trzcinski, 953 F.2d at 313.
230. E.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 540 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 304 (1993); J.C. Wyckoff& Assocs. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1482
(6th Cir. 1991); Siggers v. Barlow, 906 F.2d 241, 247 (6th Cir. 1990) (Kentucky law); Davis v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 873 F.2d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 1989) (Georgia law); Boynton v. TRW,
Inc., 858 F.2d 1178, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. May,
860 F.2d 219, 222 (6th Cir. 1988) (Kentucky test); Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Ballou, 839 F.2d
1171, 1176 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988) (Kentucky test); O'Neal v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 860 F.2d
1341, 1347 (6th Cir. 1988); Finch v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 1426, 1429 (6th Cir.
1987) (Tennessee law); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1985);
Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co., 738 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1984); Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l
Bank, 716 F.2d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 1983); Foster v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 714 F.2d 654, 656
(6th Cir. 1983); Gootee v. Colt Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1057, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983); Warkentien
v. Vondracek, 633 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980); Garrison v. Jervis B. Webb Co., 583 F.2d 258, 261
n.4 (6th Cir. 1978); Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1974); Moskowitz v.
Peariso, 458 F.2d 240, 244-45 (6th Cir. 1972); DeGarmo v. City of Alcoa, 332 F.2d 403, 404
(6th Cir. 1964).
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1981, in Gold v. National Savings Bank,231 the court reviewed its "well set-
tled" rule in light of contrary circuits and then-recent Supreme Court lan-
guage, 232 especially the Court's 1977 decision in Donovan v. Penn Shipping
Co. ,233 in which the Court applied a federal rule of waiver on appeal. 234
Nevertheless, the Gold court found no need to reconsider its position since
the facts in that case satisfied the panel that the jury's verdict had to be
reversed either as unreasonable or due to a complete absence of evidence, as
Tennessee would require. 235 The court added, however, that the "continued
vitality" of the state-standard rule "is open to question. '236
Given this background, it might seem that the Sixth Circuit over the last
decade has been a prime candidate to join the majority's federal-test rule. It
was all too easy to jump from the 1981 query to the conclusion that a change
in. the Sixth Circuit policy was necessarily imminent, as an eminent com-
mentator did.237 Yet it should be recalled that the court thirteen years ear-
lier had also noted that "recent developments would make a review of our
position appropriate" 238 but there too left the question open. 239 After 1968,
likewise, the court did not develop the internal conflict found in other cir-
cuits or abandon its questioned rule.
The public soul-searching in Gold, then, was merely "deja vu all over
again," to phrase a coin. More fundamentally, since its later caution in
1981, the court has still consistently applied a state test as its "well estab-
lished" rule, 24° usually without discussion - including routine applications
in unpublished opinions24I and opinions handed down recently,242 even after
further Supreme Court decisions and rule amendments instructive on the
issue. 243
In addition to ignoring recent precedent, the Sixth Circuit's position may
not be entirely consistent with the circuit's application, in reviewing a new
trial motion, of a federal test2" (sometimes with state tests said to be "in-
231. 641 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
232. Gold, 641 F.2d at 434 & n.3.
233. 429 U.S. 648 (1977).
234. See infra text accompanying notes 310-11.
235. Gold, 641 F.2d at 434 & n.3.
236. Id. at 434 n.3.
237. See WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 92, at 609 n.21 (suggesting Seventh Circuit may be the
last stronghold of the state-test rule; cites Gold to indicate Sixth Circuit reexamination of
issue).
238. Lones v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 398 F.2d 914, 919 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1063 (1969). The recent development was Hanna. See supra note 12.
239. See Lones, 398 F.2d at 919.
240. Arms v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 731 F.2d 1245, 1248 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984).
241. See, e.g., J.C. Bradford Futures, Inc. v. Dahlonega Mint, Inc., 907 F.2d 150 (6th Cir.
1990) (table); Hannah v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 762 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1985) (table) (apply-
ing Michigan law).
242. See supra note 230.
243. These courts generally do not discuss Anderson and Browning-Ferris or the amend-
ment to Rule 50, examined infra text accompanying notes 312-55.
244. E.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 541-42 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 304 (1993); J.C. Wyckoff& Assocs. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1487
n.20 (6th Cir. 1991) (though noting similarity of Michigan test; no contrast drawn to earlier
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structive" 245). Unlike the Seventh Circuit, however, this dichotomy has not
been so obviously in tension since panels of this court find the state review
law to be at least relevant or comparable to a new trial motion. Yet by and
large the Sixth Circuit does distinguish without much analysis the circuit's
federal rules on new trial246 and on summary judgment. 247
The jury review rule is nonetheless important. To be sure, many Sixth
Circuit cases do apply an almost identical Michigan test.248 Yet because
circuit cases may apply Tennessee law which provides the stricter complete
absence jury review standard, 249 the use of a state standard may influence or
control several actions and appeals in that court. The impact may also be
felt when panels apply Kentucky's jury test of clearly erroneous,250 which
presumably has less deference than reasonableness review. 251
An example in which the choice of the test seemed to control the final
result is Finch v. Monumental Life Insurance Co. ,252 in which the court ap-
plied a state's "any material evidence" test to review a jury verdict in favor
of a life insurance beneficiary. 253 The insured had failed to pay his premium,
but his widow testified that he regularly did so when he received a notice.
The insurer sent four such notices to several people in its files; the insured
was in its files; notices were mailed; but no direct proof was offered that
notice was specifically sent to or received by the insured. This raised a suffi-
cient inference that he did not receive notice, so the judgment entered on the
verdict was affirmed. 254 As the dissent countered, the insured had just writ-
ten the insurer a threat to "discontinue coverage" after a 30% rate hike, yet
the jury's finding assumed that he did not do so but instead failed to receive
four separate notices sent in four batches to a file of names which included
the insured's (and others did receive them).255 The inference that all four
letters were misdirected was "a truly extraordinary coincidence, ' 256 said the
discussion of state j.n.o.v. test). New trial and j.n.o.v. were not distinguished in Finch. See 820
F.2d at 1429-31.
245. See, e.g., Humble v. Mountain States Constr. Co., 441 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1971).
246. See generally Arms v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 731 F.2d 1245, 1248 n.2 (6th
Cir. 1984) ("worth noting" that federal test used on new trial review).
247. See Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Veg. & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427,
430 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983) (specifically distinguishing use of state review rule on j.n.o.v. from
federal summary judgment test).
248. The Michigan test focuses on reasonableness. See Kupkowski v. Avis Ford, Inc., 235
N.W.2d 324 (Mich. 1975); Caldwell v. Fox, 231 N.W.2d 46 (Mich. 1975).
249. See, e.g., Gold v. National Savings Bank, 641 F.2d 430, 434 & n.3 (6th Cir.) (discuss-
ing and applying Tennessee law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); see also supra note 176.
For example, on this test the court has reversed a directed verdict granted to plaintiffs on
rather slender evidence of arson, see Arms, 731 F.2d at 1252 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("the
circumstantial evidence here was simply insufficient"); the choice of a state jury test may have
affected this controversial result.
250. See, e.g., Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Ballou, 839 F.2d 1171, 1176 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988)
(describing and applying Kentucky clear error test).
251. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
252. 820 F.2d 1426 (6th Cir. 1987).
253. Id. at 1430 (citing Tennessee law).
254. Id. at 1430-31 (affirming denial of j.n.o.v.).
255. See id. at 1433-34 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 1433 (adding that jury inference was speculation).
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dissent, not sufficient to support a plaintiff's verdict. Nevertheless, that
might be the inevitable result of no evidence review, on such facts, where the
usual federal review would demand reversal.
3. The First Circuit: Off-and-On State Tests
The First Circuit has somewhat less consistently applied the state stan-
dard of sufficiency in diversity cases, 257 though in practice the tests recited
tend to sound like a federal reasonableness standard. 258 These cases none-
theless defer directly to a state standard, at least in passing, without also
citing a federal test or otherwise mooting the issue. Thus the circuit must be
included within the list of courts that expressly employ state law review, 259
even though its commitment to the rule appears weak and intermittent:
some panels simply recite without comment a general test, which appears to
be a federal one, in diversity cases. 26 °
4. The Federal Circuit: Possible Federal Test?
The Federal Circuit, for reasons of procedure and its peculiar subject-
based jurisdiction, is even more difficult to nail down on this issue - if it is
to be confronted at all.2 6 1 The court, citing policies of comity and district
court uniformity, makes itself bound by the procedural law of the geo-
graphic circuit in which a case arises. 262 In the context of that controversial
rule, it has described jury review for sufficiency of the evidence as proce-
257. DeMedeiros v. Koehring Co., 709 F.2d 734, 737 (1st Cir. 1983); Wilson v. Nooter
Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501-02 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865 (1973); cf. Carota v. Johns
Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448, 450 (1st Cir.) (holding that state evidentiary rule which permits
admission of settlement evidence is to be applied in diversity case since jury's hearing of evi-
dence affects substantive rights of plaintiff), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990); DaSilva v.
American Brands, Inc., 845 F.2d 356, 359 (1st Cir. 1988) (merely reciting the DeMedeiros
standard, also in a Massachusetts diversity case).
258. See DeMedeiros, 709 F.2d at 737 (finding that under Massachusetts test, question is
whether any circumstances permit a rational inference to be drawn for plaintiff).
259. But cf WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 92, at 609 n.21 (noting that the Seventh Circuit may
stand alone).
260. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 124-25 (1st Cir. 1992) (using
reasonable person test and citing First Circuit precedent, though earlier this court had thought-
fully considered Erie issue of whether jury trial exists and found the question to be federal).
261. The issue may not be confronted often because such appeals by definition involve
federal claims. The circuit has set up its own procedures to avoid winding up with jurisdiction
over the kinds of non-patent and non-trademark claims which would be typified by diversity
claims. See generally Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1427-28 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (en banc) (discussing problem of jurisdiction when patent claims accompany claims
based on other law). Research has not disclosed any cases performing sufficiency review over
explicitly state-based claims. Nevertheless, given the tension and uncertainty as to jurisdiction
inherent in this specialized court, see id. at 1441 (two concurring judges regret foray into
difficult and far-ranging issues involving court's specialized jurisdiction and use of regional
law), diversity claims may in future cases supplement patent and trademark appeals, so the
court would have to address whether the state-law claims are reviewed under state law.
262. E.g., Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(deference to regional law driven by trial court uniformity), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2957
(1992); Moxness Prods., Inc. v. Xomed, Inc., 891 F.2d 890, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Panduit
Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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dural, not substantive. 263 This reasoning causes the court to apply another
court's standard of jury review in many cases, 264 though other cases with no
explanation of a possible inconsistency simply recite a general, federal review
test which looks to be provided by Federal Circuit precedent. 265
More fundamentally, this characterization in effect hints that jury review
is procedural under Erie and therefore controlled by federal law. Yet ironi-
cally the effect of that pronouncement may not be to federalize jury review
uniformly in the Federal Circuit but rather to require the court to apply a
circuit's own rule as to whether the jury test is itself state or federal. Thus,
the court may in occasional cases find itself to be controlled, in cases ap-
pealed from district courts within a certain minority of geographic circuits,
by a circuit rule which applies a state jury standard. At this time, the circuit
should be described as probably applying a federal-test rule like the majority
of circuits, with a possibility of applying a state test in a minority of its own
cases arising out of district courts that apply the minority Erie rule.
Such a result, it should be noted, would strain both the comity sought by
the court and its use of procedural law from the geographic circuit at issue:
the only reason to defer to the circuit is that sufficiency is considered proce-
dural, yet the only reason that circuit might use a state test is that it consid-
ers sufficiency to be substantive.266 If the issue is considered fully and this
paradox acknowledged frankly, the court will apply a uniform federal test in
all cases to avoid the problem. 267
D. THE "NEUTRAL" APPROACH: DON'T DECIDE ANYTHING
Several courts repeatedly "moot" the diversity issue by reviewing the jury
motion under both a federal and a state test, finding no real inconsistency in
language or application. These courts tend to expressly apply both tests.
(Even some circuits discussed above with fairly settled rules sometimes ap-
ply dual review standards so as not to re-raise the issue.268)
Many states do apply a similar reasonableness test, but the avoidance
263. Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (standard of review over
denial ofj.n.o.v. "is a common procedural question" and thus regional law applies). See Tol-o-
matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing, 945 F.2d 1546, 1549 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (ap-
plying "standard of review" as regional "procedural law").
264. E.g., Tol-o-matic, Inc., 945 F.2d at 1549 & n.2 (applying Tenth Circuit jury proce-
dures and test but finding no significant difference from Federal Circuit test); Moxness, 891
F.2d at 892 (using Eleventh Circuit test on j.n.o.v.); Sjolund, 847 F.2d at 1576 (using Ninth
Circuit test); see Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 819 & n.4 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
265. See, e.g., Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir.)
(applying Federal Circuit test on j.n.o.v.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984). See generally
Biodex, 946 F.2d at 855 n.5 (noting but not resolving interpanel conflict).
266. Thus, if the Federal Circuit defers to the geographic circuit's characterization of the
issue, it would have to apply its own federal test rather than that circuit's federal or state test.
267. Cf Sjolund, 847 F.2d at 1576 (applying Ninth Circuit test since j.n.o.v. review is
"procedural question not specifically provided for in any statute or rule"). Now that Rule
50(a) provides its own standard, the court may cite it to resolve its conflict in favor of a blanket
Federal Circuit test.
268. See, e.g., Robison v. Lescrenier, 721 F.2d 1101, 1103 n.1 (7th Cir. 1983); Gold v.
National Savings Bank, 641 F.2d 430, 434 n.3 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
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strategy is more difficult where the forum state would apply a mere scintilla
or any evidence test269 or uses other rules inconsistent with federal review.270
Even with such conflicts, however, some courts will prefer to review the
facts twice under two separate tests rather than to resolve the question of
which test is binding on the federal court.
One much-mooting court is the Eighth Circuit, which despite some cases
applying a federal test271 often finds a way to avoid the issue by deferring to
a state test but holding the same result under federal review. 272 These
courts, then, follow a rule that "where state and federal tests for sufficiency
of the evidence are similar and neither party has raised the issue, we would
look to state law as controlling. '273 (This oft-cited rule may have its origins
in a 1960 opinion by then-Judge Blackmun on this "provocative question"
which merely did what the Supreme Court had done the year before -
avoid. 274) Other panels simply apply the state standard with no comparison
to federal law, 275 thus treating the issue as if it were settled that state law
controls and leaving an obvious conflict within the circuit that most panels
won't touch.
The usual mooting cases are not clear as to what the Eighth Circuit
should do where the federal test is not similar, but presumably the state law
would control in that situation as well, at least until the court reconsiders its
position. Nor do these cases explain what the circuit would do if a litigant
actually raised the issue - which may be an unrealistic expectation given
the typical, smarter appellate strategy to argue the result under both tests if
either can support the desired result. Nor do they explain why a conflicting
269. See Miller v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting
state scintilla test). See generally supra notes 173-79.
270. E.g., Finch v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 1426 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying
state rules on burden of proof and pyramiding inferences); Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing
Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting prohibition of pyramided infer-
ences); see also supra note 207.
271. See, e.g., Charles Woods Television Corp. v. Capitol Cities/ABC, 869 F.2d 1155,
1159-60 (8th Cir.) (reciting apparent federal test, in a diversity case, using circuit's points one
way formula), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989); Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 522 (8th
Cir. 1977) (applying federal test).
272. E.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Unique Structures, Inc., 929 F.2d 1308, 1314 (8th Cir. 1991);
Bastow v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 506, 508 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding Iowa test is "sub-
stantially the same"); Carper v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 1985)
(same); DeWitt v. Brown, 669 F.2d 516, 523 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding Arkansas test similar);
McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir.) (finding Missouri test simi-
lar), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978); Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549 (8th
Cir. 1968) (finding Nebraska test similar).
273. Garoogian v. Medlock, 592 F.2d 997, 999 n.3 (8th Cir. 1979) (quoted in DeWitt v.
Brown, 669 F.2d 516, 523 (8th Cir. 1982)); Gisriel v. Quinn-Moore Oil Corp., 517 F.2d 699,
701 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing cases); accord Carper, 758 F.2d at 340; Sowles v. Urschel Labs.,
Inc., 595 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1979).
274. See Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586, 589 (8th Cir. 1960) (applying Minne-
sota test here since parties have not raised point and test is similar, as in Dick). Yet nothing in
Hanson signaled that this "disposition" should be continued for thirty-four years as a circuit
"rule."
275. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Salvador Beauty College, Inc., 930 F.2d 1329,
1332 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Iowa test); Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539-40 (8th Cir.
1990); Glass Design Imports, Inc. v. Import Specialties, 867 F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 1989);
see also Hanson, 278 F.2d at 589 n. I (citing earlier cases applying only state law).
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circuit position on the standard of review should not be addressed sua sponte
by the court. 2 7 6
This comparativist strategy is sometimes called a "neutral position, ' 277
though that adjective makes the approach sound better than it really is since
it never resolves anything beyond the facts at hand and may force the courts
to double their energies if two tests are involved. Sometimes the reasoning
becomes almost absurdly redundant or complicated, as when one Sixth Cir-
cuit case determined that a jury was neither unreasonable nor clearly
erroneous.
278
Apparently the Eighth Circuit believes it need not decide the issue since in
so many cases the state standard is "like" the federal one. 279 Perhaps so, but
it may be true only in the sense that Madonna is like a virgin, when the
applicable state standard is either clear error or any evidence. The avoidance
strategy is at best unnecessary given recent law28 0 and is at worst inefficient,
confusing, and misleading. It forces litigants to redouble their efforts and
pages. It is perhaps consistent only with the confusion which this circuit has
sometimes had regarding other issues of standards of review. 28 ' This is not a
very good compromise.
This dual strategy is also used in many cases in the Second Circuit 28 2 and
Third Circuit.28 3 For example, the Second Circuit in 1989 again noted that
it is not settled whether federal or state law governs sufficiency of the evi-
dence and, as in many cited cases, declined to resolve the issue "since there
appears to be no material difference between the two standards, at least as
276. Cf United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (standard of
review often affects outcome and should be briefed by parties; if they fail to do so, court should
decide issue sua sponte, citing Sixth and Ninth Circuits), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3039 (1992);
FED. R. App. P. 28(a)(5), (b) (as amended effective Dec. 1, 1993) (explaining that litigants now
must brief the "applicable standard of review" for each issue).
277. Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433, 437 n.8 (3d Cir. 1969) (describing Second, Third,
and Eighth Circuits' approach).
278. See Moskowitz v. Peariso, 458 F.2d 240, 244-45 (6th Cir. 1972) (citing Kentucky
cases on both tests).
279. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Unique Structures, Inc., 929 F.2d 1308, 1314 (8th Cir.
1991) (stating that the "test under the law of Arkansas, in any event, is similar to the federal
test").
280. See infra text accompanying notes 310-55.
281. See Childress, supra note 73, at 111-15 & nn.129, 140, 146, 152 (criticizing circuit's
use of substantial evidence in bench trials); id. at 120-21, 164 (analyzing circuit's freer review in
documentary cases); id. at 160 (noting mixing of damages procedures and discretionary re-
view). This is not to deny that other circuits have had similar problems.
282. E.g., Brady v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 740 F.2d 195, 202 n.7 (2d Cir. 1984) (leaving
unsettled question open); Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 248 (2d Cir.
1980) (applying New York test but noting similar federal test); cf Calvert v. Katy Taxi, Inc.,
413 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1969) (applying state standard alone); Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d
713, 716 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1966) (assuming New York test applies but noting open question). See
generally Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir. 1970) (discussing circuit conflict but
finding same result under federal or Vermont test); Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d
335, 342 n.2 (2d Cir. 1963) (per Friendly, J.) (comparing both sides of issue).
283. E.g., Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1211-12 (3d Cir.)
(deferring), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433, 437-39 (3d Cir.
1969) (noting internal dichotomy and citing both tests even though parties urged that court
decide issue).
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applied here."' 284 (That hardly seems true where the state test uses fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence review, 285 which evokes a new trial test and its
discretionary elements. 286) These courts tend to say that they defer to a
state test, though perhaps more accurately "deferential" here means to defer
the issue to a later panel or the en banc court.287
The Third Circuit, despite cases citing a state standard alone,288 has ap-
peared to be pushing toward applying its federal standard. For example, the
court has cited without discussion, in some important diversity appeals, a
general review test which certainly looks federal. 289 In one such case, the en
banc court in 1979 cited for its test a diversity case which likewise recites a
general test without explicit reference to state law.2 90
More significantly, in another Third Circuit case Judge Aldisert offered
reasoned dicta supporting a federal test.29 1 Although this 1969 decision ap-
pears to avoid the issue by noting the similarity of federal and state stan-
dards, the clear import of the opinion is that the circuit is moving toward its
federal standard, and his best arguments support that position. The court
noted that early state-test cases had been largely replaced by recent cases
using a federal test, or deferring to a state test where the difference is not
decisive. 29
2
However; since both this extensive discussion and the court's subliminal
application of the federal test in 1979, the circuit has deferred to a state test
where it would not appear to be decisive, 293 apparently again to avoid facing
the issue squarely. In a related vein, the court has explicitly held that it
applies a state rule preventing the waiver of an immunity defense which
would be waived if the normal federal prerequisites of a Rule 50 motion were
enforced, 294 an issue of Rule 50 review arguably more procedural than the
. 284. Willis v. Westin Hotel Co., 884 F.2d 1556, 1563 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989); see Mehra v.
Bentz, 529 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1975) (open question), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
285. This was done with little explanation in Billiar, 623 F.2d at 248, in which the court
deferred since the New York test was "virtually identical."
286. See supra notes 118-20, distinguishing new trial review. The circuit clearly distin-
guished the standards in Bevevino v. Saydjari, 574 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1978).
287. See Denneny, 407 F.2d at 439 (stating that since tests are "substantially similar," "we
defer the choice of action urged upon us by the parties").
288. E.g., Haldeman v. Bell Telephone Co., 387 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1967); Cooper v. Brown,
126 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1942); see also Leizerowski v. Eastern Freightways Inc., 514 F.2d 487,
489 (3d Cir. 1975); Denneny, 407 F.2d at 437 (citing older Third Circuit cases "uniformly"
applying state tests); cf. Drenning v. Williams, 344 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (stating that
federal law governs issue of when jury must decide whether elements exist), aff'd, 480 F.2d
1220 (3d Cir. 1973).
289. See, e.g., Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1067 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1671 (1992); Kinnel v. Mid-Atlantic Mausoleums, Inc., 850 F.2d 958, 961
(3d Cir. 1988).
290. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1273 (3d Cir. 1979) (en
banc).
291. Denneny, 407 F.2d at 437-38, 440.
292. Id. at 438.
293. See Blair v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 296, 304 n.I (3d Cir. 1982) (Garth, J.,
dissenting on other grounds).
294. Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1085-86 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1671 (1992). Yet elsewhere the court seems to apply a federal standard for eviden-
tiary sufficiency. See id. at 1067. For its state waiver rule, the court does not discuss or distin-
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rule's review standard. A more recent panel, by some contrast, stated flatly
(but without much support) that it "applies the federal standard for judging
the sufficiency of the evidence in diversity actions, '295 yet nevertheless noted
that Pennsylvania law is similar. 29 6 This federal-rule case may be treated as
if it restates a rule that has always existed, 29 7 but the number of cases which
are contrary, or moot the issue by citing a state test too, signifies that it
would be premature to consider the Third Circuit as having truly resolved
its internal split. At this time it is still fairly described as a dual-strategy
court.
In all of these circuits, what looks like a practice of judicial conservatism
- avoid, moot, defer - is in reality problematic and inefficient. Although
the strategy may be consistent (albeit anachronistic) with Hanna's apparent
direction to apply state and federal law where there is no conflict, 298 it often
affects analysis where consistency is not so easily found and it fails to recog-
nize other cases within the same court which are flatly contradictory. And
even where it makes no difference in outcome, it is an affirmative political
statement that another judicial body's law applies - an act of deference not
justified by precedent or policy. It is better described as a state of denial.
E. THE SUPREME COURT: AVOIDANCE AND GUIDANCE
The circuits have taken these various positions long after the Supreme
Court in 1959 expressly recognized the dilemma, in Dick v. New York Life
Insurance Co. 299 In that case the Court, like many lower courts, felt no need
to resolve the conflict since the tests available were similar. 3° Again the
Court mooted the issue five years later in Mercer v. Theriot,30 1 this time after
taking certiorari to address the conflict.
Even before the Court faced and avoided the problem, it had anticipated
it. In 1958, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative,30 2 the Court
- noting "a strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the
judge-jury relationship in the federal courts" 30 3 - found that federal law
controls whether a particular issue should be submitted to the jury or judge,
guish Penn Shipping, in which the Supreme Court held that a federal waiver rule applies in
remittitur review, a similar context.
295. Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992). For this rule, the court
cites only a 1965 federal case, a treatise, and the Kinnel case (which had applied a federal test
without discussion), and does not discuss ample contrary precedent.
296. Id. This opinion may overstate the similarity of Pennsylvania's review rule. See Den-
neny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433, 437-39 (3d Cir. 1969) (describing Pennsylvania's test).
297. See Garrison v. Mollers N. Am., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 814, 817 (D. Del. 1993) (Rule
50(b) motion presents a federal question, citing Rotondo but not noting contrary cases); 5A
JAMES W. MOORE & Jo D. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.06 (Supp. 1992-93)(citing Rotondo as stating the issue is federal; this supplement does not discuss contrary cases
and errs in describing Rotondo as holding that review is for abuse of discretion only).
298. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965).
299. 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
300. Id. at 444-45.
301. 377 U.S. 152, 156 (1964) (per curiam).
302. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
303. Id. at 538.
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assuming sufficient evidence exists to support a jury trial on the issue if it is
triable to a jury.3°4 But that Court reserved the sufficiency issue, noted its
own inconsistencies, and provided dicta implying that sufficiency is state
substance: it footnoted a reference to a 1940 case which it characterized as
having established that state standards apply for sufficiency "to raise a jury
question." 305
By leaving the question open in Dick and Mercer, the Court did implicitly
clarify that the cited 1940 case had not really settled the issue by its dicta on
state jury review since no directed verdict question was before the earlier
Court. 30 6 That new forms of analysis would apply to this particular issue
was also foreshadowed by Hanna v. Plumer,30 7 in which the Court made
Erie analysis more flexible and refined 30 8 in the course of deciding to apply a
federal rule allowing substituted service of process despite a conflicting state
rule. At any rate, the sufficiency issue was regarded as difficult. 309
More recently, the Court has provided language in similar contexts that
would appear to support use of a federal test in the sufficiency situation too.
In 1977, in Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co. ,310 it held that a federal rule would
control in remittitur situations, requiring that one accepted at trial would
preclude review of the issue on appeal. Echoing Byrd, the Court specified:
"The proper role of the trial and appellate courts in the federal system in
reviewing the size of jury verdicts is ... a matter of federal law."' 3 11
In 1989, the Court extended this ruling in Browning-Ferris Industries v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc.312 In finding that new trial motions on damages are
subject to an abuse of discretion standard, 313 the Court held that in a diver-
sity case federal law governs "those issues involving the proper review of the
jury award" in federal courts, 314 even though state law controls "the propri-
ety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question, and the
factors the jury may consider in determining their amount. ' 315
304. Id. The Court cited at length (and apparently reaffirmed) a pre-Erie decision that held
that federal law governs to allow a judge to take an issue from the jury, because it is the kind of
issue which may be decided by a judge, despite a contrary state rule. See Herron v. Southern
Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931). But cf. Comment, Arizona Constitutional Law Derailed in Fed-
eral Diversity Court. A Reevaluation of Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 16 ARIz. L. REV. 208
(1974).
305. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 540 n.15 (citing Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464
(1940)).
306. Cooper, supra note 7, at 973 & n.210; see WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 92, at 608 ("It is
hard to believe that Stoner held what the Court later said it held.").
307. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
308. See infra text accompanying notes 368-71.
309. The Court's past reluctance may have stemmed less from indecision as to the implica-
tions of Erie - the Court then was answering such questions left and right - than from an
unwillingness to pin down the general federal test itself. See supra note 182, discussing the
difficulty generally.
310. 429 U.S. 648 (1977).
311. Id. at 649.
312. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
313. See id. at 276-80. The Court was reviewing a $6 million punitive damage award for its
possible excessiveness under the Constitution.
314. Id. at 278 (citing Penn Shipping).
315. Id. Once the award is found to be within the confines set by state law, review is made
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A federal rule precluding review, in Penn Shipping, now had supported -
with merely a citation - something of a federal review standard in this con-
text. 316 Because Rule 59 (governing new trials) no more provides a review
test than did Rule 50 (traditionally governing directed verdicts and j.n.o.v.),
Browning-Ferris supports the assumption that federal law will provide the
standard to review a jury verdict in either of these contexts. 317 And because
many of the same Erie policies would seem to apply for sufficiency review as
well as damages,31 8 it is not a big jump from either Penn Shipping or Brown-
ing-Ferris for lower courts to conclude that the propriety of a jury verdict, as
well as its preclusion or size, is a federal matter.
In 1986, the Court may have even more subtly decided the issue or at least
implied the result, in two landmark cases handed down the same day, in
which the Court refined summary judgment law: 319 Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc. 32Q and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.32 1 Both cases were treated as
diversity cases, both applied federal summary judgment law extensively, and
both fashioned summary judgment rules by analogy to federal directed ver-
dict standards under Rule 50(a). 322 No mention was made of any contro-
versy over state standards in diversity cases, and in fact the Court discussed
the "run-of-the-mill civil case,"' 323 presumably including diversity cases, to
support its analogy to what look like broad federal rules of jury review.
by a federal standard of review. Id. The Second Circuit had been unclear which standard it
used but was affirmed nonetheless on a federal abuse of discretion test, applied in light of the
broad range of factors Vermont law allows juries to consider. Id. at 280.
316. The Court thus ignored, perhaps deliberately and as precedent for the Erie issue, the
fundamental differences between a scope of review (which issues are properly addressed on
appeal, e.g., waiver by failure to properly object below) and the standard of review (how that
review if allowed will be made, how much deference will be given on the issue, and considering
what materials). See J. Dickson Phillips, The Appellate Review Function: Scope of Review, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (1984) (clearly distinguishing).
317. Courts less controversially apply federal tests on new trial motions, and that context
has been distinguished as more readily federal, even in courts (like the Seventh Circuit) which
use state standards on legal sufficiency of the evidence. See supra text accompanying notes
214-21. The analogy is not complete, but both do involve "review of the jury" in a broad
sense, and Browning-Ferris gave no hint it was distinguishing jury review writ large. Of course,
it did not purport to decide the much-mooted sufficiency issue, either.
318. See infra text accompanying notes 417-24.
319. See supra note 59.
320. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
321. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
322. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Although both came
from the District of Columbia, they apply local D.C. substantive law without hesitation and
otherwise treat the cases as diversity actions. The Court in Anderson explicitly describes it as a
"diversity libel action." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 245. More generally, a federal court hearing a
case from the District of Columbia is held to apply Erie rules even though it is not a state. See
supra note 192. Even if an argument could be made that the Court's use of D.C. cases avoids
the Erie issue because such cases are not required to follow Erie, it is doubtful that Justice
White would have used the term diversity if he meant to limit the sweeping analysis to federal
question cases.
323. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The opinion clearly applies outside its First Amendment
context. See id. at 257 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 113 S. Ct. 1689,
1694 (1993) (stating generally that -[i]n determining whether a material factual dispute exists,
the court views the evidence through the prism of the controlling legal standard"); Lujan v.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885-90 (1990) (applying 1986 summary judgment pre-
cedent generally).
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More on point, the Court rejected a scintilla rule for both summary judg-
ments and directed verdicts324 without any noted hesitation for diversity
cases which arise in states using the scintilla test.
To the extent summary judgment is analogous to jury review - and the
Court indeed expressly made them more "mirror"-like 325 - federal courts
may similarly decide to apply federal jury standards in all cases (though in
1986 it was possible again to distinguish summary judgments as arguably
more controlled by federal rule326). And the Court treated summary judg-
ment as a question of law for testing the sufficiency of the evidence 327 with
no distinction drawn from the mid-trial or post-trial sufficiency process. Yet
even if the analogy fails, the Court has spoken directly to broad jury tests
and expressly made them applicable to the directed verdict, a procedure ob-
viously provided by federal law even in a diversity case. 328
The Court provided a similar description of Rule 50(a) review very re-
cently, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 329 In reviewing the
admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Justice Blackmun cautioned that other protective procedures are
available to ensure against misuse of junk science. Such "conventional de-
vices, rather than wholesale exclusion," include summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law;330 the trial court "remains free to direct a judg-
ment, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 50(a) .... ,,331 Significantly, Daubert is expressly
a diversity case, 332 cites diversity cases to illustrate this power, 33 3 and gener-
ally makes no distinction for diversity cases in its evidentiary analysis or its
comparison to sufficiency reviews such as Rule 50.
Even if none of these cases actually fashioned a holding as to jury review
for sufficiency, in the aggregate they leave little doubt how the Court now
324. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52 (majority opinion). All the cited cases are federal
law cases, though many are pre-1938 cases which would not raise an Erie concern. See also
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993) (diversity case describing
review of a scintilla of evidence as applying similarly to summary judgments and to Rule 50
judgments as a matter of law).
325. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (stating that standard for summary judgment "mirrors
the standard for a directed verdict"); Rotondo, 956 F.2d at 442. See generally Jeffrey W. Stem-
pel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Di-
rected Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 95 (1988) (discussing Court's
overlap of two motions).
326. Even so, Rule 56 no more provides the controlling reasonableness test than did former
Rule 50. It was read into Rule 56's genuine issue by the Court, and only by paralleling federal
jury review generally.
327. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-52; see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2279 (1993) (citing Anderson generally for unreasona-
bleness test); Neely v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 345 & nn.2-3 (9th Cir.
1978) (treating summary judgment sufficiency question as related to j.n.o.v. sufficiency and
therefore federal).
328. See also supra note 89 and accompanying text, in which the Salve Regina Court char-
acterized diversity jurisdiction as not affecting a wide array of review situations.
329. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
330. Id. at 2798 (majority opinion).
331. Id.
332. Id. at 2791 (removal by diversity).
333. Id. at 2798 (citations omitted).
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
views that process. They may be read to foreclose the minority position on
all forms of jury review.
F. THE 1991 AMENDMENT TO RULE 50 AND THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT
Although directed verdicts traditionally have not had the advantage of
having their review test specified by a federal rule,33 4 unlike Rule 52's clearly
erroneous rule,335 they do spell out a relationship between judge and jury,
and among courts, in a way that can be seen as procedural even if it does
affect how the merits are finally viewed.3 3 6
More significantly, Rule 50(a) as amended in 1991 now actually specifies
that evidence must be a "legally sufficient . . . basis" such as to allow "a
reasonable jury to have found" for a party on an issue.3 37 Rule 50 is thus
interpreted as including the standard of review within the rule itself.33 8 This
language may encourage courts to find sufficiency to be now more a proce-
dural-rule issue, where federal law controls. After all, review of findings by
judges after nonjury diversity trials is held to be specified by federal law, in
part because there is a federal rule on point.339 Likewise, in the minority
courts, retention of a state standard for sufficiency review has at times been
justified by the lack of a federal rule on point, especially where the panel
must acknowledge and distinguish the use of a federal new trial test.34° That
missing link is no longer really absent.
Of course, careful judges and academics will recognize that placing a re-
334. Cf Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-74 (1965) (often read as indicating issues
specified by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if arguably procedural, preempt state practice);
Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988) (rules capable of classification
as procedural are constitutionally authorized); Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35,
38-39 (2d Cir. 1984) (because specific federal rule governs service, it applies in diversity even if
state law conflicts); Seltzer v. Chesley, 512 F.2d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 1975) (Rule 51 applies
under Hanna).
335. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The more settled use of a federal test for diversity nonjury
trials is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 80-94.
336. See infra notes 385-95 and accompanying text.
337. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
338. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) Advisory Committee Notes, 1991 Amend. (subdivision
(a)(1) "articulates the standard for the granting of a motion for judgment as a matter of law,"
as taken from "long-standing case law").
Elsewhere I do argue that the amended rule, despite its advisory notes, does not clarify the
standard of review or resolve the circuit conflict over what the reasonableness test means. See
Steven A. Childress, Judgment as a Matter of Law: A Pretense of Consistency, A Return to
Technicality (1994) (unpublished manuscript available from author). Nevertheless, it cannot
be denied that the drafters intended to place the standard of review within the new rule. That
rule "provides" a review test within it as much as do Rule 56 for summary judgments and
Rule 52 for nonjury trials - two contexts in which the applicable review language must be
interpreted and applied in later cases as well. See Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Ra-
tioning and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645
(1988) (Rule 52's strength is its flexibility as applied).
339. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., Boynton v. TRW, Inc., 858 F.2d 1178, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (stat-
ing, as one reason to apply state sufficiency test, that Rule 50 did not set out a review stan-
dard); see also Cooper, supra note 7, at 983 n.238 ("Rule 50 [then, in 1971] lacked standard
within it," so Hanna's mandate to use federal rules "does not affect the present problem").
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view standard into the rule does not quite resolve the Erie question - it just
changes it (perhaps from an exclusively Rules of Decision Act341 problem to
principally a Rules Enabling Act 342 one). 343 Now the first inquiry should be
whether the specified standard is so substantive that its inclusion in a federal
rule offends the limits of the Enabling Act,344 and that is where Hanna's
language of "arguably procedural" better fits; the rulemaking is acceptable
because it is rationally classified as procedural.3 45 (This answers any Tenth
Amendment problems as well.3 46) And then it is acceptable under the Rules
of Decision Act, to the extent that inquiry remains necessary, because it does
not violate Erie's central concerns, including forum-shopping and inequita-
ble administration of the laws. 347 But the location of the standard within the
rule certainly bolsters the case for treating the issue as procedural and im-
plicitly resolved, especially in the way courts really do apply this aspect of
Hanna.348 Even critics of courts which fail to sort out the various Erie in-
quiries recognize that, after Hanna, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure found
valid under the Enabling Act likely controls over conflicting state law.349
Perhaps the federal courts have always had their jury review standard
specified by another federal "law" - the Seventh Amendment - without
really acknowledging it. That provision limits the federal court power to
review civil juries350 since "[n]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
341. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (present version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1988)).
342. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064 (present version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1988)).
343. See generally Kane, supra note 11, at 675-76 (carefully distinguishing inquiries about
"substantive" by which statute is involved).
344. See id. at 675.
345. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. Actually the arguably procedural term is Justice Harlan's
characterization of the majority's approach, id. at 476, but it seems accurate. In fact, the test
appears in the section regarding the rule's constitutionality and thus is criticized in its use as
an interpretation of Enabling Act cases. Ely, supra note 11, at 719-20 (proposing that En-
abling Act inquiry be given more analysis and weight than courts tend to do, even if federal
rule is on point, but noting Hanna's unhelpfulness).
346. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988).
347. See infra text accompanying notes 368-84.
348. See, e.g., Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 23, at 980 (policy of preventing forum-shop-
ping generally outbalances a competing policy-based common law rule, but yields to specific
Federal Rule based on statutory authority); cf Ely, supra note 11, at 697 (caricaturing under-
standing of Hanna - its "hard-hearted rendition" that a rule "even arguably procedural is to
be applied in a diversity action," despite state law - but citing several sources using that
approach).
349. E.g., Kane, supra note 11, at 675. Some deference to state interests was maintained by
requiring scrutiny into whether the laws actually clash; if they do not, then courts may con-
sider whether Erie's policies under the Rules of Decision Act require application of state law.
Id. Indeed, a strong presumption exists that rules put through the enabling process are proce-
dural. Id. at 678; see also Braman & Neumann, supra note 28, at 443 (under Enabling Act, if
state rule is procedural, specific federal rule applies).
350. E.g., Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992) (judge findings
"need a stronger evidentiary base" than jury verdicts do because jury sanctity is protected by
amendment); Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 99 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1991) (though
does not apply to states); WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 95, at 643 (cases announcing sufficiency
rule refer to jury function and Seventh Amendment).
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the common law."'351 To be sure, this does not provide or even authorize a
specific standard of review,3 52 but courts today routinely present their stan-
dard of review as an application of the Seventh Amendment3 53 and justify
strict Rule 50 procedures in part by reference to the limited power to grant
j.n.o.v. implied by the amendment. a54 The circuits may have had the key to
the federal-rule dilemma in their own backyard all along, though rarely say-
ing so, 355 such that the Erie issue should have been resolved long before the
Supreme Court spoke and Rule 50 changed. Dorothy could have clicked her
heels on first leaving Munchkin Land and avoided the messy roadtrip, but
she had to want it badly enough. Likewise, state-rule courts desiring change
may need recent sources to justify it, since the Seventh Amendment was
there every time they reconfirmed a state rule. Perhaps the recent law will
spur these courts to realize that they finally need a change badly enough.
G. WILL THE STATE-LAW AND "NEUTRAL" COURTS, OR EVEN THE
SUPREME COURT, DECIDE?
Given this impressive body of doctrine - especially the amending of Rule
50 and recent Supreme Court guidance touching on the issue if not deciding
it outright - the minority position, as a matter of doctrinal consistency at
least, can no longer stand.
Perhaps the Court itself will in an appropriate case grant certiorari to re-
solve the circuit conflict in favor of a federal test, using its own precedent
and rule change to sanction the majority view. 356 Indeed, the Court has
increasingly granted certiorari on standards of review issues in many con-
texts. 357 Yet the circuits should not hold their breaths for an imminent rec-
onciliation by the Court on this issue, especially since it has been so easy to
351. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
352. See Cooper, supra note 7, at 976-78, 990 (arguing that since Seventh Amendment does
not sanctify a particular standard, it does not mandate a federal test in diversity cases).
353. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (patently unreasonable
verdicts do not merit constitutional protection, so courts may review verdicts for sufficiency as
a question of law consistent with Seventh Amendment); Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co.,
405 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (4th Cir. 1969) (review rule has Seventh Amendment interplay); see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) Advisory Committee Notes, 1991 Amend. (jury review is only "to
assure enforcement of the controlling law and is not an intrusion on any responsibility for the
factual determinations conferred on the jury by the Seventh Amendment"); In re Air Crash
Disaster Near New Orleans on July 9, 1982, 767 F.2d 1151, 1165-66 (Tate, J., dissenting);
Cooper, supra note 7, at 978 & n.220 (collecting sources which argue that federal test follows
from application of Seventh Amendment in all federal cases).
354. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) Advisory Committee Notes, 1991 Amend. (noting constitu-
tional issue but preferring to rest timing rules on policy of allowing parties to cure defects).
355. Cf Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 1991) (justifying use of
federal sufficiency review in part by limit of Seventh Amendment which "always" applies to
federal judges); Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 1983)
(questioning state-standard rule for its "Seventh Amendment implications").
356. Compare, for example, Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 459 U.S. 1007, 1009 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), in which the Court was urged to resolve the
broader circuit conflict on the jury review standard generally. Although that case involved
federal antitrust law without state law questions, perhaps the Court in ending the circuit split
would have stated a test generally applicable in all federal cases.
357. See, e.g., I CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72, § 1.02.
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avoid in lower courts and has been avoided by the Court itself for thirty-five
years. Moreover, the general context of civil jury review is one place where
the Court has itself openly divided on whether the matter should be heard at
all, and the majority said no over Justice White's lone dissent. 358 Justice
White is now retired, and few others on the Court have maintained compa-
rable attention to circuit consistency on standards of review issues. 359
Will the current Court have the energy to revisit a question for which the
parties likely will not urge an outcome-determinative position in their peti-
tions?36° Probably not. One might speculate that Justice Ginsburg will not
really replace Justice White in terms of his apparent interest about the jury
review issue, especially as it relates to the related Erie problem. Justice
Ginsburg has sat on the D.C. Circuit, which has had a consistent federal rule
and has seen no need to revisit the issue; given that perspective, the Erie
issue may look relatively routine and uneventful. It may be that the Court
will find its internal voice urging reconciliation only in a newer appointment
arising from a circuit, such as the Eighth, which has had to spend years of
judicial energy in avoiding the problem or applying ever-changing state
standards.
Nevertheless, any minority panel otherwise now skeptical of a state-stan-
dard rule probably does not need to hold its breath. To the extent these
circuits wish to change or cement their review rule in favor of federal law,
they can do so by en banc resolution, 36' as the Fifth Circuit in Boeing 362 did
in part on the Erie issue itself.
Even that drastic remedy - and.en banc resolution is increasingly un-
likely for busy courts - is not required; these circuits' panels themselves
may choose a uniform federal rule whatever their mixed precedent on point.
This is so, despite a rule of panel stare decisis363 normally used in such
358. See supra note 356.
359. Cf Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 485 U.S. 981 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Court should decide review standard for certain constitu-
tional appeals); Euroquilt, Inc. v. Scandia Down Corp., 475 U.S. 1147 (1986) (White, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) (Court should decide review standard for trademark issue);
Elby's Big Boy Inc. v. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc., 459 U.S. 916 (1982) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (same); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (authoring
-majority opinion in landmark Rule 52 case rejecting ultimate fact doctrine).
360. Cf Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152, 156-57 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (after full
briefing, it became apparent at oral argument that no meaningful difference existed, so case no
longer had substantial question).
361. In other contexts, courts have met en banc to resolve conflicts on standards of review
issues. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capitol Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(review of Rule 11 sanctions order); In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (no
deference to district court on state law); see also supra note 276.
362. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), discussed supra in text
accompanying note 196.
363. The term, better described as interpanel accord, requires each circuit panel to defer to
previous panels' rulings on law within the circuit, subject to en banc modification. No defer-
ence need be given sister circuits. See I CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72, § 6.02; Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Richard Marcus, Conflicts
Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677 (1984).
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courts, 364 because all courts recognize that panels need not defer to cases
decided before an intervening change in governing case law or amendments
to applicable rules. 36 ' In this context, both Supreme Court precedent and
the 1991 amendment to Rule 50, even if not precisely on point,366 act as
sufficient fodder for a panel to reexamine and alter its own precedent in light
of that intervening authority.
That the minority circuits should indeed adopt a settled test, and choose
their federal one, is supported not only by the intervening law but also by
Erie theory and policies. If the state-standard rule was wrong all along for
such reasons - but previously could not be changed under stare decisis3 67
- its change may now be triggered by use of the intervening authority, even
if the position chosen is justified more satisfyingly and less technically by
considering the modem scope and goals of Erie.
IV. ERIE THEORY: ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY TO DECIDE
A. TRADITIONAL ERIE POLICIES AND MODERN GUIDELINES
Using traditional Erie analysis as it has developed under Hanna,368 it ap-
pears that the issue is necessarily federal. Hanna loosened Erie's apparently
tight reins by rejecting "application of any automatic, 'litmus paper' crite-
rion,"' 369 instead emphasizing the twin principles of outcome determination
and the deterrence of forum shopping that underlie Erie.370 Lower courts,
in turn, stress these factors in sorting out federal/state dilemmas. 371
Use of federal review does not appear to be outcome-determinative in any
364. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 124 (1st Cir. 1992); lB
MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 43, 0.402[1].
365. See, e.g., Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., 728 F.2d 221, 224 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984); Davis v.
Estelle, 529 F.2d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 1976); 1B MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 43, 0.402[1]
(collecting cases).
366. See Gallagher, 962 F.2d at 124 (force of panel stare decisis rule "dissipates when newly
emergent authority, although not directly controlling," convinces panel that previous panel
would change its course "in light of neoteric developments").
-367. Even that position overstates the strength of panel stare decisis, at least in courts
which have conflicting internal precedent. Use of either test theoretically violates panel stare
decisis, yet some rule must be chosen, so courts have their own (unsettled) sets of rules - first
case? last case? best case? - guiding how the internal conflict must be resolved, often short of
en banc resolution. See I CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72, § 6.02.
368. See generally Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1989);
Kane, supra note I1; Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie Pur-
poses, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068 (1989). The entire Erie agenda and enterprise is criticized in
John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Continued Vitality of Erie, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1087 (1992).
369. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). Hanna, more accurately, loosened the
reins of cases which followed soon after Erie; it attempted to sort out Erie itself.
370. Id.; see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2137 (1991) (outcome-deter-
mination must be read in terms of Erie goals of avoiding forum-shopping and inequitable ad-
ministration of laws).
371. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Johnson, 668 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1982) (emphasizing factors of the
effect on the outcome, likelihood and prevention of forum-shopping, and any overriding fed-
eral interest); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979).
Of course, such courts have been criticized for not clearly sorting out the two different
statutory contexts in which Erie issues arise (and then applying the specific test for that con-
text), as well as turning supporting language from Hanna into "tests" or an unbridled policy
balancing. See, e.g., Braman & Neumann, supra note 28, at 401-13. Nevertheless, it is clear
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sense the courts actually employ, as one state-rule court has nearly con-
ceded. 372 Of course, the review test may make a difference in a particular
case, but for this factor the courts tend to focus on the necessary and inevita-
ble impact across nearly all such cases. 373 As many sources note, the impact
of "outcome determination" has lessened since Hanna because it would
mean little if read to its extreme: 374 "It is difficult to conceive of any rule of
procedure that cannot have a significant effect on the outcome of a case."' 375
In most jury review cases, the test's impact is slight or none, allowing
many courts to moot the Erie issue itself.376 Any change in outcome only
occurs after some part of the trial has occurred and varies on the facts of
each trial - hardly a predictable or generic effect (unlike a statute of limita-
tions). On appeal, the review process is even further removed and less im-
mediate. Thus, it should not be found to step over Hanna's policy that a
state rule not be ignored if it would "make so important a difference to the
character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly
discriminate against citizens of the forum state . . . -377 Nor does the choice
seem to broadly implicate the inequitable administration of justice3 78 since
most versions of jury review are long-standing, find support in ample prece-
dent, are similar, or lead to similar results.
The other strong concern is forum-shopping. Here, it does not seem likely
that lawyers even in states with a different review test will choose a federal
forum just because they will want a verdict more easily overturned on re-
view. 379 Such a choice would defy the optimism and immediacy of trials
because it would assume a focus on post-trial remedies to an anticipated
failure of proof or strategy at trial.380 The fear that at trial a strategic factor
that these forms of analysis are actually used in most courts, see id. at 405-06, 468-74, and it
may nonetheless be true that Byrd's balancing approach is still viable. See infra note 391.
At any rate, all such tests or balances are considered here seriatim, as this article demon-
strates that a federal test is mandated under any of the -competing views of Hanna. Cf
Braman & Neumann, supra note 28, at 474 (arguing that courts have misunderstood and un-
derapplied Ely's clarifying analysis); Ely, supra note I1, at 699-700 (arguing that courts have
misunderstood and underapplied Hanna's clarifying analysis).
372. See Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 1983).
373. See Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1066 (4th Cir. 1969) (fed-
eral test applies since outcome-determinative test is neither inflexible nor universal); FLEMING
JAMES ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.37, at 128-30 (4th ed. 1992) (Byrd and later cases mean
that outcome-determination in strict sense is not controlling).
374. See, e.g., Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 962 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980), rey'd on other
grounds, 450 U.S. 785 (1981); cf. Ely, supra note 11, at 717-18 (describing common view that
Byrd qualified an extreme description of outcome-determination, and Hanna further refined
and indeed "rejuvenated" it).
375. Hansen, 619 F.2d at 962 (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS 273 (3d ed. 1976)).
376. See, e.g., supra notes 268, 274, 296, and 300.
377. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9.
378. See generally id. at 468; see also Herbert v. Wal-Mart Stores, 911 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th
Cir. 1990) (Hanna means courts look to twin aims of Erie: avoiding forum-shopping and the
inequitable administration of the laws); Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679, 687 (5th
Cir. 1991) (same).
379. Plaintiff motions are especially unlikely. See I CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72,
§ 3.06.
380. Judge Posner has argued that jury review may have a disproportionate and systemic
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will be present is more realistic for issues that are bound up with the state
issues raised, like trial burdens. For sufficiency, however, it is hard to be-
lieve that application of the state rule "would have so important an effect
upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to enforce it
.would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court," as Hanna
requires. 38 ' (Nor does the choice of law seem to "substantially affect those
primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional sys-
tem leaves to state regulation. '3 82) Forum-shopping seems far more likely
to occur where summary judgment practice differs,38 3 yet that is an area
where it is established that federal practice governs federal courts. 38 4
Beyond these two factors, courts often ask whether an overriding federal
interest exists. 38 5 On this front, use of a federal standard is supported by the
oft-cited sanctity of the judge/jury relationship in federal courts:38 6 one "es-
sential characteristic" of the federal system "is the manner in which, in civil
common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between the judge and the
jury .... ",387 Thus, there is "a strong .federal policy against allowing, state
rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts. 3 88 In simi-
lar contexts, the Court has described this relationship as an inherently fed-
eral one justifying federal review rules; 38 9 on the sufficiency issue itself, some
majority courts likewise cite this relationship as inherently procedural, re-
quiring a federal review rule.3 90 A balancing of federal interests,39 1 then, has
impact, see supra note 220, and therefore may (if the federal test is more liberal) induce diver-
sity plaintiffs "to shun federal court" and defendants to remove; or (if less liberal) cause plain-
tiffs "to flock to federal court .... Abernathy, 704 F.2d at 971. Note, however, that such a
party would have to anticipate the result at trial and not fear the impact of the other review
test if that guess is wrong.
381. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9.
382. This test is from Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring). See Wratchford,
405 F.2d at 1065-66 (sufficiency rule "plays no role in the ordering of the affairs of anyone");
Cooper, supra note 7, at 982 (though arguing for state law on some aspects of review, notes
that "it is extremely difficult to conjure up a situation in which disregard of state directed
verdict standards would interfere with private planning of private activity").
383. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diver-
sity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 438-40 (1992) (finding that
defendants shop forums for liberal summary judgments).
384. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
385. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Johnson, 668 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1982) (Erie analysis asks, inter alia,
whether any overriding federal interest is served); Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 554
F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
386. See generally 5A MOORE & LuCAS, supra note 43, 50.06, at 69.
387. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
388. Id. at 538.
389, E.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279-80 (1989)
(review rule over propriety of damages award justifying new trial); Donovan v. Penn Shipping
Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (waiver rule in remittitur context).
390. See. e.g., Garrison v. Mollers N. Am., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 814, 817 (D. Del. 1993).
391. There exists something of an academic debate over the extent to which Byrd policy-
balancing in its broadest brush survived Hanna and when it rightly is invoked. Compare Ely,
supra note 11, at 717 n. 130 (arguing, at least for Rules of Decision Act issue, that "there is no
place in the analysis for the sort of balancing of federal and state interests contemplated by the
Byrd opinion") with Richard Bourne, Federal Common Law and the Erie-Byrd Rule, 12 U.
BALT. L. REV. 426, 464-68 (1982) (criticizing Ely for failing to acknowledge the continued
viability of Byrd balancing) and Kane, supra note 11, at 675-76 & n.32 (Byrd balancing was
refined and given a framework by Hanna, which applies a general policy inquiry). Resolution
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evolved in favor of promoting judge/jury symbiosis.
The relationship is especially protected when one concentrates on the ex-
act issue presented by pure sufficiency review - legal reasonableness of the
jury - rather than on similar but decoy issues, such as trial burdens and res
ipsa loquitur.392 The "similar" issues arguably do affect substantive interests
in that they intertwine sufficiency in a factual sense with state law issues that
incorporate the primary rights and duties of the parties. 393 By contrast,
standards of review measure the extent to which these rights and duties are
satisfied in the same way that any procedure sets up a process to determine
rights and duties.
More to the point, review for sufficiency (even more than the underlying
law, burdens, and presumptions) by definition specifies the relationship be-
tween a judge and jury: that's all that it is about. Standards of review in
general are now understood as, at a minimum, a system of allocating deci-
sionmaking authority within the judicial system. 394 That is no less so when
the allocation is between the two actors judge andjury; 395 indeed, sufficiency
review, in its modern understanding, is the paradigm of distributing power
between them.
The Supreme Court has recently made clear that trial burdens and other
standards of proof are not the same as review standards, in that the latter
"describe, not a degree of certainty that some fact has been proven in the
first instance, but a degree of certainty that a factfinder in the first instance
made a mistake in concluding that fact had been proved under the applicable
standard of proof."' 396 That state-law burdens and presumptions must al-
ways be kept distinct from jury sufficiency, even as to the Erie issue raised
here, is illustrated by the Court's analysis in Dick.397 In deciding that state
presumptions must be followed, the Court simultaneously found no need to
is not crucial here. There is no doubt that courts routinely ask what federal interest is pro-
moted (as the Supreme Court has, specifically as to related review problems), even if it is not
really weighed against a comparable state interest. It is at least a relevant factor in Hanna's
larger policy inquiry reflected in such concerns as the inequitable administration of justice.
392. Cf Cooper, supra note 7, at 975-89 (courts should focus on precise review issue in
deciding choice-of-law: emphasizing that burdens and res ipsa are substantive state law,
though, here, in arguing generally that jury review is in part a matter of state law, not federal
as most commentators paint it).
393. See, e.g., Association of Am. R.Rs. v. ICC, 600 F.2d 989, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(substantive law creates underlying rights and duties).
394. Martha S. Davis & Steven A. Childress, Standards of Review in Criminal Appeals:
Fifth Circuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REV. 461, 464 (1986) (most important issue
is not the stated standards themselves but rather the allocation of power among the deci-
sionmakers in the criminal process that they reflect); Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative
Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels. A Unified View of the Scope
of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 997-98
(1986) (review standards are principal means by which decisional power is divided between
trial and appeal).
395. See Louis, supra note 394, at 1027-29 (law-fact classification also controls assignment
of power between judge and jury); Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408, 1416 (4th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (describing allocation between judge and jury as necessarily procedural).
396. Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264,
2279 (1993).
397. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
decide whether state directed verdict practice also controls. 398
Some of the inconsistency in the cases and commentators, then, may stem
from failing to carefully distinguish similar-sounding review issues from true
sufficiency review. Burdens and presumptions are part of the substantive
package in a way that is simply not shared by the review test itself, even to
the extent the test necessarily includes application of trial burdens and pre-
sumptions as part of the substantive law reviewed. The Court in Ander-
son 39 9 incorporated local standards of proof into the jury review test itself
without hinting that the review test thereby becomes state law. Indeed, the
measure of sufficiency appears generically federal in such a diversity case at
the same time the burden is applied as part of the test.4° ° As some courts
have clarified: "What they [the plaintiffs] needed to prove to make a jury
case is, of course, to be measured by [state] substantive law. Whether they
proved such a case is a matter of federal procedural law . . . ."40 Even
though "what" is proved now considers substantive burdens and presump-
tions, the "whether" should be no less procedural.
Looked at in another way, the Supreme Court, by recently incorporating
standards of proof into the total review-standard package, has effectively de-
flected the most powerful justification which could have been used by the
minority circuits. Perhaps the state-standard rule could be supported, at
least as to some aspects of sufficiency review, by arguing that standards of
proof are state substance so that a federal review test would ignore that im-
portant point by failing to give the state burden its proper due. 40 2 Now,
however, the Court has included that "due" (whether the substance of the
burden comes from state law, constitutional privilege, etc.) within the stan-
dard of review itself by making sure review is understood to build the burden
into the review process. If that makes an erstwhile-federal test more state-
like in those applications, so be it.403 The critics get to be "right all along."
But the measure of sufficiency in its most controversial aspects (any evidence
test? look to one side of the evidence only?) is decidedly answered by federal
precedent. Thus, the minority courts seeing state substance within suffi-
ciency review can now clearly sort out and maintain the substance (e.g.,
standards of proof) while newly recognizing the issue to be governed by a
federal process.
398. Id. at 445-46; see Cooper, supra note 7, at 983-84 & n.242 (Dick illustrates that the
Court is not "overwhelmed by the analogy to burden of proof rules and presumptions" though
the author accepts similarity).
399. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
400. See supra text accompanying notes 320-28. Compare infra note 404.
401. Owens v. International Paper Co., 528 F.2d 606, 609 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis in
original), quoted in Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 346 n.1 (4th Cir. 1982).
402. See Cooper, supra note 7, at 976, 983-90 (arguing for deference to state law on this
and similar aspects of sufficiency review). A related argument is that, to the extent review
standards, like trial burdens, define how this state applies its substantive law, perhaps they
should not be disembodied from that substance. Now it is clear that trial standards and bur-
dens are embodied within federal review.
403. Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (after correcting summary judg-
ment standard, asking whether showing would suffice to carry respondent's burden at trial,
Court remands in deference to circuit's "superior knowledge of local law").
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The confusion may also reflect a mixing of the question of whether the
evidence suffices generally and factually with whether a certain issue is the
kind that is legally submitted to a jury, which is arguably more a substantive
issue.404 Even so, the Court has indicated that the jury-right issue is itself
provided by federal law,4° 5 and this rule is recognized even in courts which
apply state sufficiency rules.4°6 If a substantive/procedural distinction is to
be urged, it would seem to apply more powerfully to the jury-right problem
- while the sufficiency issue, as a measure and a process, seems less
substantive.
Even to the extent the tests for rejecting a verdict as legally insufficient
seem substantive, 407 that label over the years has become less decisive on
many Erie-type issues. 4 0 8 The courts today find more help in looking to the
underlying principles of Erie and its progeny than in falling back on amor-
phous characterizations. 40 9 This returns the inquiry to outcome, forum-
shopping, and federal interests - all supporting the application of federal
law.
B. UNIFORMITY
One policy that Erie's progeny often invokes is a concern about uniform-
ity, apparently of both substantive law and, to some extent, outcome. These
issues are answered by applying the traditional and modern Erie analysis
considered above. But a different set of policies favoring uniformity within
federal practice actually supports applying a federal test of sufficiency.
Admittedly, Erie was not primarily about uniformity within federal
courts. Instead, it emphasized the evil of forum-shopping between a state
and federal court410 - though that concern seems most obviously to apply
to a Rules of Decision Act problem 41' rather than a Rules Enabling Act one,
where federal uniformity may be valued. At any rate, federal uniformity is
still a factor to be generally considered and a policy worth promoting, 412
404. See generally I CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72, § 3.09 (arguing that the question
of whether issue is "legal" and therefore not submitted is a matter of substantive law, not
standard of review).
405. See supra notes 6 and 304; see also Pinehurst, Inc. v. Schlamowitz, 351 F.2d 509, 513
n.7 (4th Cir. 1965) (law-fact classification is federal, under Byrd).
406. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 122 (1st Cir. 1992).
407. See Abernathy, 704 F.2d at 971 (sufficiency review intertwines with substantive law
and thus justifies use of state rule); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 1969)
(en banc) (federal test controls though arguably substantive).
408. See Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 23, at 941 ("[c]oncentrating on what is procedure
and what is substance, however, has little to do with what is really at issue"); Kane, supra note
11, at 673 (Erie created'new "balance of power . . . controlled by the wavering (sometimes
almost evanescent) line between substance and procedure"; article elsewhere clarifies various
definitions of "substantive" under Rules Enabling Act and Rules of Decision Act, and applies
them to statutes of limitations).
409. Stoner v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1979).
410. See Ely, supra note 11, at 715 n.125 (Erie chose vertical uniformity over horizontal
uniformity as its primary goal).
411. See id. ("Rules of Decision Act had made a choice").
412. See Braman & Neumann, supra note 28, at 412 (one interpretation of Byrd requires
courts to weigh outcome-effect against "federal interests in promoting a uniform and efficient
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even if it is not controlling. It appears to be a legitimate value involved in
the weighing of federal interests that Byrd requires: in addition to the usual
federal interest in protecting the judge/jury allocation, federal uniformity
promotes the fair and efficient administration of justice.
At the very least, policies of uniformity serve as a good justification to
adopt federal review if it is allowed, even if the Erie analysis which allows it
focuses on different factors. Moreover, Erie is often read as a decision cru-
cially about predictability, 413 and a more uniform federal rule - especially
abandoning the "neutral" rule - necessarily promotes such a federal policy.
Thus, use of a federal rule is supported, however decisively, by four forms of
federal uniformity.
First, the circuits should be uniform among themselves in their choice-of-
law rule on this issue. That the circuit split exists and persists serves no
useful purpose. It is even wasteful to the extent it encourages courts to re-
double their decisionmaking effort in each case. 414 If courts could conceiva-
bly worry about forum-shopping along the state/federal hierarchy, they
could similarly dread conscious decisions to select a specific federal forum, if
jurisdiction and venue allow, which has a desired standard of review: the
plaintiff seeking eventual any evidence affirmation would choose a federal
forum applying a strict state test, or at least avoid a federal court among
federal courts which would apply the less-generous general federal test. Not
likely? Probably human conduct is not so foresightful, but that is why the
traditional forum-shopping factpr was not realistically a problem in the first
place. If indeed it is, perhaps the same could be said for federal forum-
shoppers.
Second, and more significantly, resolution of the choice-of-law issue
should be uniform as to the different review postures that arise in litigation.
No good reason exists for having state standards of review specified for some
types of review while federal review is prescribed in other contexts within the
same court (and sometimes in the same case). The Erie problems would
appear to be the same, yet have uncontroversially been resolved in favor of
federal law in so many other litigation settings. 415 Can it be denied that
decisions on summary judgment have similar, if not worse, odds of outcome-
determination and forum-shopping? Is factfinding of a judge after a bench
trial so different for its Erie evils? Most courts and sources simply do not
federal system"); cf Corr, supra note 368, at 1129-30 (using federal uncertainty and complex-
ity as factor in urging overruling of Erie); Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 23, at 954-55 & n.55
(Erie is more concerned with federal/state shopping than state/state shopping, but existence of
diversity jurisdiction presumes some positive value in federal/state shopping).
413. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 513-15 (1954); cf Ely, supra note 11, at 715 n.125 (arguing that such a
common reading is overdone since some disuniformity is inevitable).
414. See supra text accompanying notes 277-81.
415. See supra text accompanying note 153. Majority courts often support their federal
review rule by analogizing to other review situations. E.g., Neely v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 345 & nn.2-3 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing j.n.o.v. rule in summary
judgment context); Oldenburg v. Clark, 489 F.2d 839, 841 (10th Cir. 1974) (j.n.o.v. review
and new trial motion).
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draw the comparison, though generally it should be recognized that the re-
view process is similar (with varying levels of deference and scrutiny defined
by the standard of review). 41 6
One contrast that is occasionally drawn is between new trial and suffi-
ciency reviews in those courts that apply state j.n.o.v. review. 4 17 These ef-
forts to distinguish the two contexts appear rare and half-hearted at best, 418
and seem to focus on possible outcome-determination or forum-shopping
differences. 41 9 Perhaps the minority courts could focus instead on a more
fundamental distinction between the two types of motions - between law
and discretion: the appellate court defers to a trial court's discretion to grant
or deny new trial, while the legal sufficiency of the evidence must be re-
viewed with no real interim contribution by the trial court.4 20
But while it is true that sufficiency is by definition a question of law, that
label is more a convenience necessary to avoid Seventh Amendment
problems than it is a true description of the process. Jury review for suffi-
ciency is at bottom a review of the facts and evidence supporting a verdict -
the process is steeped in the record - and only its defining threshold uses
(must use) the term question of law. In other words, a verdict is "legally"
insufficient because the record support fails. While that process is stricter
and less discretionary than is new trial review, it cannot be seen as defining
any less the relationship between a federal court and its jury. Moreover,
such motions are very often brought together and are thought to frame simi-
lar inquiries, but with different thresholds and remedies. 4 2' And the Court
in other contexts has recited general federal review over questions equally
about the sufficiency of a verdict as a matter of law.4 2 2 Interestingly, this
more realistic distinction between such motions is not generally used to jus-
tify a different Erie choice, possibly because upon examination it too seems
like a distinction without a difference.
The Supreme Court increasingly seems to support a more uniform ap-
proach to the Erie issue for standards of review (even if the standards them-
416. See generally Louis, supra note 394.
417. Similar analysis could apply to require reconciliation of courts, like the Fifth Circuit,
which have a firm federal j.n.o.v. rule but some panels implying a state new trial standard. See
supra note 122.
418. See Abernathy, 704 F.2d at 971 (sufficiency review [state] distinguished from new trial
test [federal], but notes counterarguments and recognizes the "usual assumption" [again sup-
porting uniformity] that whether state law applies "must be answered the same way" for suffi-
ciency and excessiveness).
419. See supra text accompanying notes 214-21.
420. United States ex rel. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Bucon Constr. Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th
Cir. 1970) (discussing in non-Erie context). The trial court may grant a new trial if in its
opinion the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or will cause an injustice, even
though substantial evidence prevents granting j.n.o.v. Id. at 423-24; see also 5A MOORE &
LUCAS, supra note 43, 50.03 (comparing new trial and j.n.o.v.); I CHILDRESS & DAVIS,
supra note 72, § 5.11 (same).
421. The Rule 50 procedure for combining sufficiency and new trial motions, as well as
their similar review process, is thoroughly discussed in Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries
- Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 Wisc. L. REV. 237, 277-313.




selves necessarily diverge by context). It has discussed summary judgment
practice by citing directed verdict cases (without a distinction for diversity
cases). 423 It has stated even more broadly, in applying a uniform de novo
review over district court decisions about state law, "Nothing about the ex-
ercise of diversity jurisdiction alters these functional components of decision-
making .... -424 Likewise, nothing about the functional components of
decisionmaking should alter the Erie choice of law.
Third, the courts need to establish uniformity among appellate issues gen-
erally. Appellate review is a package of three parts: timing (jurisdiction),
scope of review (what issues are addressed), and standard of review (how
they are addressed). 425 No good reason exists to distinguish these for Erie
purposes, especially since all are part of the broader process of appellate
review and again seem to raise similar Erie concerns. The Court has already
made an effortless leap between them by citing its federalized remittitur
waiver rule in order to justify a federal new trial standard of review.4 26 Simi-
larly, the Court has expressly applied federal, not state, law on the jurisdic-
tional issue of appealability and timing4 27 - with no mention of any
concerns or qualifications which would distinguish scope or standards of re-
view. Placing all appellate issues into one box for Erie purposes allows the
courts to develop a consistent practice in all phases of what is most accu-
rately described as three aspects of one institutional function and allocation
of authority.
Finally, courts should have a uniform Erie stance regarding all jury proce-
dures specified by Rule 50. It is relatively settled that the rule's preservation
and waiver aspects apply in federal court despite state leniency. 428 Yet these
aspects are only marginally more "procedural" (and certainly more out-
come-determinative 429) than are the standards of review aspects now also
embedded in Rule 50.
Four versions of federal uniformity, then, suggest that jury review fall into
line. Indeed, to rule otherwise is to isolate jury sufficiency review as the only
423. See supra text accompanying notes 322-24.
424. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991).
425. J. Dickson Phillips, The Appellate Review Function: Scope of Review, 47 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 1, 1-2 (1984). See generally PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON AP-
PEAL (1976).
426. See supra text accompanying notes 315-16. The scope of review on appeal has long
been a matter of federal law. See 5A MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 43, 50.06, at 69.
427. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198-99 (1988); see Cold Metal
Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 453 (1956) (Rule 54(b) is valid as
promoting modern judicial administration in federal courts); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (applying federal doctrine of interlocutory appealability in a
diversity case); Napolitano v. Flynn, 949 F.2d 617, 621 (2d Cir. 1991) (appealability is federal
law).
428. See 5A MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 43, 50.06, at 68-69 ("federal law clearly gov-
erns matters specifically covered by Rule 50," such as preclusion rules). But cf. Simmons v.
City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1085-86 (3d Cir. 1991) (treating Rule 50(a) waiver as
"substantive"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1671 (1992).
429. See Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1085-86 (applying state rule against waiver due to effect on
outcome). By contrast, the panel apparently treated sufficiency review as federal. See supra
note 294.
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appellate review issue, the only jury issue, and the only standard of review
issue which is not federal law - and only in some circuits.
C. ALLOCATION OF ADJUDICATIVE DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY
REVISITED
Ultimately appellate and review authority, along with its shadowing Erie
question, must be about the proper allocation of institutional roles, power,
and respect. By this measure, the context of sufficiency review - though the
one engendering the most controversy - is paradoxically the best paradigm
of federal decisionmaking. It invokes three separate and important
relationships.
First, sufficiency review defines the oft-invoked relationship between judge
and jury - perhaps more so than in other contexts where that factor seems
determinative. The waiver rule in Penn Shipping, for example, is really
about reviewability, and as such only defines the relationship between a dis-
trict court (offering remittitur in its discretion) and its appellate court, yet
the Court echoes the judge/jury analysis to make its point. 430 In Browning-
Ferris, the Court's consideration of remittitur may look like review of the
jury, but technically it is a review of the judge's review of the jury. At least
for the district court considering sufficiency, review of the jury is more di-
rect. 43 1 Thus, the discretion given a district court on new trial, rather than
justifying a distinction for Erie purposes, actually defines the judge/jury rela-
tionship less than it does a trial/appellate assignment of decisionmaking
authority. 432
Second, that trial/appellate relationship (which most review cases really
address) is indeed important. Yet it is no less absent in sufficiency review,
which defines both the trial judge's evidentiary review and the appellate
court's response to both judge and jury.4 33 That the trial court's initial deci-
sion is effectively taken out of the appellate review does not deny the
trial/appellate allocation - indeed it defines it, it is the appellate review
standard. Even direct review by the trial judge has overtones of "appellate"
authority because the court is acting in a reviewing capacity. 4 34 Some con-
texts that are directly about appeals - for example, Salve Regina's assign-
ment of lawmaking power to the appellate court - are missing the
judge/jury relationship deemed so federal yet are no more defining of the
appellate role than is Rule 50.4 3 5 Using a policy analysis which focused on
430. See supra text accompanying notes 3 10-11.
431. Even on appeal, sufficiency review is more direct in the sense that it is de novo, while
new trial review must consider two different decisionmakers below.
432. The trial judge's own review of the jury is discretionary but limited, and the limitation
is a federal matter under Browning-Ferris. Sufficiency review is simply more limited.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
434. See generally I CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 72, § 1.04 (erstwhile trial courts act
as appellate-like reviewers in many ways). This dual role is more blatant in administrative law
but similar. Cf. Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct.
2264, 2280 (1993) (under statute, arbitrator is both a reviewing body and a factfinder).
435. Indeed, Rule 50 mentions various appellate procedures every bit as much as does Rule
52, especially after 1991.
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the institutional competencies and roles of district and circuit judges, that
Court found the appellate courts to be "structurally suited to the collabora-
tive juridical process that promotes decisional accuracy. '436 Similar analysis
(though with a different outcome: deference) must inform the assignment of
power to juries.4 37
Third, modem courts considering the impact of Erie on difficult choice-of-
law issues cannot escape falling back on some view, articulated or not, of the
proper allocation of decisionmaking authority within a federal/state sys-
tem.438 In that light, the crucial federal/state relationship is not hindered by
application of a federal review rule. That relationship has been worked out
- roughly and confusingly, to be sure - over years of case law interpreting
Erie. Hanna especially must be seen as allowing significant rulemaking au-
thority to Congress and the federal courts, 439 and nothing in the balance that
has evolved since then denies a proper place for federal court decisionmak-
ing. Indeed, all indications are that the institutional allocations within fed-
eral courts and among state and federal courts (the latter through Erie and
its progeny) justify a uniform federal review process.
The particular sufficiency issue has been avoided so long and so often,
possibly because it so starkly becomes a decision about a similar assignment
of roles within the federal system itself. Yet therein lies the theoretical, pol-
icy, and precedential solution to this long-standing Erie problem. Jury re-
view for sufficiency of the evidence is about the only litigation context that
leans to the federal end of three accepted continua, to an extent not even
found in more settled settings.
V. CONCLUSION
The applicable judicial review in diversity cases is not as settled as com-
mentators tend to paint it, although a majority of federal courts use a federal
test while others note that there is no real conflict in application. A state-
standard rule, applied consistently or sporadically in at least five circuits and
infecting sporadic cases in others, was once titillating but now belongs in
Jurassic Park. The better view seems to be that federal standards should
define the propriety of a federal jury's action, though not its substance, and
436. Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 225. Thus, de novo review "best serves the dual goals of
doctrinal coherence and economy of judicial administration." Id. at 231. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist in dissent analogized to Supreme Court cases giving deference, using a policy analysis of
allocation of resources and urging "intuitively sensible deference." Id. at 242.
437. See supra notes 394-95; see also Martin B. Louis, Discretion or Law: Appellate Review
of Determinations that Rule 11 Has Been Violated or that Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Will Be
Imposed Offensively, 68 N.C. L. REV. 733 (1990) (arguing that courts should use analysis, not
labels, to resolve review problems, which are determined by promoting optimal judicial deci-
sionmaking); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (using policy/institutional analysis to allo-
cate mixed law-fact questions).
438. See generally Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 812-
15 (1989) (arguing that Erie is, at bottom, a decision about orbits of and limits on lawmaking
competence).
439. Cf Ely, supra note I1, at 697 (describing common perception that "Hanna therefore
may not be Erie, but it seems to be the law").
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that those courts which tend to avoid the issue might use recent Supreme
Court pronouncements to fix their test in one predictable spot.
Even so, recent cases decided after further Supreme Court guidance tend
to simply repeat earlier positions on this controversial issue, merely citing a
case which cites a case." Usually the state-review courts do so with no
analysis of Erie's principles and goals as applied in modem courts, and even
without discussing whether recent precedent forces a change in their time-
worn rule.
Instead, these courts should reconsider the issue in light of recent case
law, rules changes, and the policies and theories driving Erie-type decisions
today. All of these point to choosing a uniform federal rule of review - and
especially choosing to choose, once and for all. It is true that "federalism is
not a tidy concept,""' but it need not be as messy, in this respect at least, as
it remains.
440. See, e.g., supra notes 194, 223, and 243; see also Braman & Neumann, supra note 28,
at 472 ("Stare decisis often plays a role by binding later courts to earlier versions of incorrect
analyses.") (footnote omitted).
441. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 56, at 364.
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